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1. In ehe European-Atlantie area at least, the eoneept of diplomatic
proteetion has been known as one of the most essential elements of publie
international law for many eenturies.' In its traditional form which was
worked out primarily by eminent legal sdiolars like Hugo Grotius' and Erneric
de Vattel', diplomatie proteetion means the right of a State to grant every
kind of shelter and assistance to its nationals who are injured by acts of fore ign
Stares not in eonformity with the law of nations. From this point of view,
diplornatic proteetion may be deserib ed as a positive aspeet of the rules on
State responsibility.' Sinee the international person will be regarded as being
thereby violated in its own rights, too," this entity is free to take various
means of proteering itself against the wrong-doer within the legal limits of
attitudes generally allowed by publie international law.· During the last
deeades of the nineteenth century in partieular, diplomatie protection by
horne countries took the form of military intervention,
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outright invasion of ehe territories of some newly independent states in Latin
Ameriea . This kind of state behaviour was by no means held to be illegal
at those times.' It may be no great surprise rhen, that internationallaw jurists
in the souehern part of the western hemisphere developed a di fferent doctrine
of the right of diplomatie protection. The origin of the new way of thinking
ean without much diflieulty be traeed back to Cerlos Caloo , an Argentine
dipl omat and sdiolar." In his view, the basic legal prineiples of independenee
and sovereign equal ity of Stares only jusrifies the eonc1usion that there is no
genera lly reeognizable eoneept of diplomatie prorecr ion j'" at the very least ,
howeve r, the .exercise of any such right would have to be severely restricted
in seope as weIl as in di aracter."
-The new doetrine soon beeame aeeepted as a rule of munieipallaw in certain
Latin Ameriean States and was enaeted partly as a eonstitutional provision,"
and elsewhere as a mere statutory norm", To corroborate th e effeets of th e
Caloo doctrine in every individual case, "waiver" c1auses were inserted into
many contraets between a Calvoist Stare and foreign private persons'" stipu-
lating a prohibit ion on the invocation of diplomatic protection. Notwithstand-
ing ' um efforts, Caloo's theory never gained more than regional acceptance
in those countries where it ' was first elaborated."
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More recently, eertain protagonists of a New International Eeonomie
Order started onee again vehement attacks on the procedural aspeets of the
protection of (private) property abroad, If a provision of the Charter of
Eeonomie Rights and Duties of Stares - a United Nations' General Assembly
resolution of Deeember 12,1974" - would have in Fact beeome part of publie
international law (holding that normally "in any ease where the question of
eompensation [for nationalizing, expropriating or otherwise transferring
ownership of foreign property] gives rise to a eontroversy, it shall be settled
under the domestie law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals")", the
right to diplomatic protection would have ceased to exist in this field of public
international law." Such declarations were not followed however, by any
subsequent Stare practice under which circumstances a modification of current
international custornary law would at least have been impending. It happened
otherwise: In the further course of events, there was another change of view,
not the least within the framework of the United Nations' Organization, and
onee more the traditional coneept is gaining ground that ahorne Stare is
entitled to submit international claims on behalf of its nationals.' During the
debates on a United Nations' Code of Conduct for Transnational Corpo-
rations, this ancient theory W;tS awarded an even extended field of application
by encompassing the protection of the mostly privately-owned "mult inational"
enterprises."
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These procedural elements were no Ionger a focal point of the debare within
the Commission on Transnational Corporations, however. Today it is the issue
of applicable substantive norms for the treatment of aliens which is most
heatedly discussed.
2. The change of attitudes towards the concept of diplornatic protection
does not at all mean that there is a more limited scope for exercising th is right
in contemporary times than there was in earlier days. Just the opposite seems
true: The fact that the number of Stare subjects of publ ic international law has
steadily increased since the end of World War 11, particularly du ring the
period of decolonization," is likely to multiply the imminent dangers for aliens
in the territories of Stares other than their own". In respeet of the relationships
berween States, ahorne country may nearly always be able to follow certain
well-known patterns of lawful diplomatic action towards thc injuror. No such
standing practice, however, exists in cases of (presumed) illegal acts by inter-
governmentalorgans - i. e., institutions founded by agreements being governed
by public internationallaw -, even if they could lead to direct and/or serious
injuries of individual persons. During the past deeades, these intergovern-
mental organizations (IGOs) have grown in number as well as in influence to
yet unknown dimensions although they were exceeded in this respeet by other
international entities of a non-governmental character (INGOs)." The struc-
tu re of the international governmental organizations however, has not changed
with similar speed, but has remained a kind of inter-state co-operat ion, and
the sovereignties of member countries have hardly in any way been endangered
by their establishment." Conscquently, only the international persons founded
by, and attached to, an organizarion are enabled by virtue of the legal order
of each institution to become an addres see of normative acts emanating Frorn
an intergovernmcntal organ. In contrast, nationals of member Stares will be
directly in touch only with acts of organs of their own State which were caused
by those intergovernmental directives. This speeific inducement of State acts,
however, their mere implemental character in relation to international legal
investit ionen im modernen Völkerrecht: Eine Standonbestimmung. in: Schweizerisches Jahr-
buch für Internationale. Recht (Sd>w.}b.Int.R.) vol. 37 (1981), 25-58 (51-56).
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in the recent editions of ehe Yearbook of International Organ izat ions, e, g., vol . 19 (1981).
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obligations does not have any partieular relevanee for private persons." In
such instances, remedies whidi are generally at hand will be available, leading
to a judieial review of munieipallaw aets of a publie law nature", and there
is no need nor reason for exercising diplomatic protection.
3. In some speeifie instances however, it may happen sooner or Iater, that
individual as well as legal persons (of domestie law origin) will be direetly
affeeted by aets of intergovernmental organs, and .these persons will therefore
be plaeed into situations which may fairly be eompared with the traditional
emergeneies making the exereise of diplomatic proteetion neeessary. These
persons would be without any other means of remedy in respeet of treatments
in violation of publie international law if their horne Stare eould not (re)aet
by exereising proteetion for the purpose of re-instituting the (international)
legal order."
a) Less important perhaps are institutions whidi were often created a long
time ago, like the various river eommissions whose fields of aetivity are
narrowly limited by their restrieted functions both in relation to the ir tasks
and their areas.28 It cannot be overlooked, however, that these entities were
the aneestors of the modern "institutional integrations" like the European
Communities whose status is somewhat unique in history up to now . The
funetions and powers of the organs of the three Communities are similar in
many respeets to those of federal Stares. Their acts, whether of a general or
of an individual character, are claiming applieation within the legal orders
cf member States, not just /or these participating countries." Such "supra-
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vol. II, Leyden 1972, 604-605. See, mcreover, the official reports of decisions of the German
Federel Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) vol . 45 (1978), 142-1 86 (164), and Chri stian
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" Albert Bleckmann, Europaredrt, 3rd ed. Köln et al. 1980, 61 .
national" pretentions are clearly expressed in arts. 189.(2) -cl. 2 of the European
Eeonomic Community (EEC), 161 (2) cl. 2 of the European Atomic Cornmunity
(EAC) Treaties, bur they were immanent as weil in "decisions" of the H igh
Authority (now : Commission'") in the case of art. 14 (2) of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty." Acts of non-stäte, but never-
theless public authorities are direeted first of all at nationals of member Stares
of the European Communities and therefore are also able to infringe the ir legal
rights , But due tO the peculiarity of the field which is regulated by Europea n
Community law in a given case," a direct encroachment upon the rights of
nationals of th ird Stares cannot be excluded once and for all." It is true that
primary community law provides for remedies in the framewo rk of the legal
order of each institution, but only under certain circumstances and wirhin
narrow limits ." Procedures for a judicial review of regulations and other
Community norms, however, are not la id down in the relevan t chapters of the
original treaties" nor can they be deduced as a result of interpreta tio n." On
the other hand, legal proceedings before national cour ts of member States, as
30 The Ccmmission of the European Communities has become - in Fact, if not in law -
the successor of ehe High Authority of the European Coal and Sreel Community beca use of
art . 9 of the Merger Treaty of April 8, 1965 (effeceive since July 1. 1967 ; see, German
Jour na l of Federa l Statutes [BGBI.] 1965·vcl . 11, 1454, and 1967 vol. 11, 2156).
31 Hans-Peter Ipstn Europäisches Gemeinsdiaf tsredir, _Tübingen 1972, 447~45 1 ; Leont in
Conuontlnesco, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinsch aften, vc l. I, Baden-Baden 1977.
602 j Bledemann (noee 29), 59-61.
32 The applicability oI th e European law on restrict ive business praetiees (i. e.; art s. 85-90
of the EEC Trcaty) in particular, does not require that an enterprise has its domicile or
residence wirhin the territories of the Common Marker, Rather, it suffiees that the effeets of
a contract or a bebaviour will bave a certain effeet in respect of the funetioning of Com-
munity affairs; ci., the eritieal remarks by Frederiek Alexander Mann , The Dyestuffs Case in
the Court of ]ustice of the European Communit ies, in: International and Compararive Law
Quarterly (ICLQ) vol. 22 (1973), 35-50 (42-50); Karl Matthias Meessen, Der räuml iche
Anwendungsbereich des EWG-Kartellrechts und das allgemeine Völkerrecht, in : Europarecht
(EuR) vol. 8 (1973), 18-38 (21-27); M. A . BlYthe, The Extraterrito rial Impact of the
Anti-Trust Laws: Prote ering British Trading Interests, in: Ameriean Journal of Comparative
Law (AJCL) vol. 31 (1982/83), 99-129 (106-1 08).
33 See also, Werner Meng, Neuere Entwicklungen im Streit um die ] urisdiktionshoheit der
Staaten im Bereich der Wettbewerbsbesdtränkungen, in: ZaöRV vol. 41 (1981), 469-513
(490- 491).
.. Am . 173 (2), 175 (3) of ehe EEC Trraty; ar ts. 146 (2), 148 (3) of the EAC Tr eary ; ar ts.
33 (2), 35 (1) and (2), 36 of the ECSC Treary. For further details, see, Cons tantinesco
(note 31), 851-863 and 878.
35 l psen {note 31), 765-767, is referring to arguments for an indirect judicial review of
their legal validity ; see also, Ham-Wolfram Daig, Art. 184, in: Ham von der G roeben I H ans
v on Boeekh I Jochen Thiesing (eds.), Kommentar zum EWG·Vertrag, vol. 11, 2nd ed. Baden-
Baden 1974, 299-306 (300) ; Constantinesco (noce 31), 903-905.
31 For a list of EEC aets capabl e of bring reviewed by th e Court of Justiee, see, H ans-
Wolfram Daig, Art. 173 and Art. 175, in: Von der Groebm tt al . (noce 35), 209-242 (225),
and 245- 257 (256-257) ; Bleekmann (note 29), 170-1 75; Constentinesco (noce 31). 854-
858.
weil as of thi rd Stares may hardly ever be sueeessful: Within the territories of
the participating countries, international organizations are immune from any
national jurisdiction in respeet of their members (possibly due to a norm of
international eustomary law)", by way and beeause of the stipulations in
special agreements ." Beyond the borders of those territories, national courts
of justiee will be unable in most instances to base their jurisdietional and
judicial eompetenees on the existenee of suffieient links with the forum State"
or they may be prohibited by (domestie) law from reviewing aets of foreign
Stares." Therefore a cirizen of the Communities might think of asking "his"
horne Stare (when neeessary by using the national judieiary) to eHeet any kind
of more viable remedial means on his behalf: A member State eould for
example deeide to institute proeeedings under art. 170 of the EEC Treaty."
Nationals of non-member Stares in a similar position will prefer an immediate
diplomatie action by their horne Stare.' But even if a member State has
37 Cj., Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Dienstrechtliche Klagen 'gegen Internationale Organi-
sationen, in : Inga v . Münch (ed.), Staatsrecht - Völkerrecht - Europarecht. Festschrift
Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Berlin, New York 1981, 615-634 (617).
88 An exceptionally narrow provision is contained in arr. 28 of the Merger Treaty the
meaning of which can only be understood by looking at the annex, i. e. ehe Protocol on the
Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities (BGBl. 1965 vol. II, 1482). It must
be read in the light of arts. 183 of the EEe and 155 of the EAC Treaties. Every organ of
a member State involved in a litigation whidt was initiated contrary to those provisions is
thereby bound to declare itself incompetent ; cj. , also arts. 219 of the EEC, 183 of the EAC ,
87 of rhe ECSC Treaties, and Hans-Wol/ram Daig, Art. 183, in: Von der Groeben el al.
(nore 35), 297-299 (297).
For an evaluation of the general rules on immunity, see, e. g., Pierre Lalioe, L'immunite
de jur idiction des Etats er des organisations internationales, in: RdC vol. 84 (1953 III), 209-
385 (291-306); Schermers (noce 25), 639; Derek W . Bowett, The Law of International
Institutions, 4th ed. London 1982, 348-350; Seidl-Hobenoeldern (note 25), 282; Köck I
Fischer (note 26), 391-392; also Friedrich Schröer, De I'application de I'immunite juridiction-
nelle des Etats etrangers aux organisations internationales, in: Revue generale de droit inter-
national public (RGDIP) vol. 75 (1971), 712-741 (737-741); and the decision of an Italian
tribunal (at Bari) of Dec . 23, 1975, in: Rivi sta di diritto internazion ale vol . 49 (1976), 574-
576.
311 See for a more elaborate explanation, Ludwig Gramlich , note, in: Die öffentliche Ver-
waltung (DöV) vol. 35 (1982), 407-408 (remarks on BVerfGE vol. 59 11982] , 63-95).
40 The critique of adecision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (of April 29, 1978, in:
RGDIP vol. 83 [1979] , 217-219, dealing with the issue of the conseitutionaliry of ehe
French consent ro the increase of its International Monetary Fund quota) is therefore shedding
some new light on Farther-reaching limitarions on judicial conerol, see the note by Dom inique
Carreau, in: RGDIP vol. 83 (1979), 209-217 (215-216).
41 Ipsen (note 31), 766, is an opponent of rhis hypothesis, whereas Bleckmann (ncte 29),
185-186, supports the concept, at least tentatively. See also, Wilhelm Karl Geck, Die Aus-
weitung von Individualrechten durch völkerrechtliche Verträge und der Diplomatische Schutz,
in: Bodo Börner I Hermann /ahrreip I Klaus Stern (eds.), Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit,
Festschrift Karl Carstens, Köln et al. 1984, 339-360 (346-354) .
42 They could follow the arguments forwarded by Wilhelm Wengier. Völkerrecht, vol . II,
Berlin, New York 1964. 1294-1295, on the position of third Stares. Peter Aubin, Die Haf-
tung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten bei gemeinschafts-
exhausted the legal possibilities provided for by the law of th e international
institution, a citizen might demand of his national public authorities to
exercise even more efficient ways of diplomatic protection, if those used first
did not reach their aim of reversing the (presumably) unlawful Cornmuniry act .
b) Only a few regiona11y restricted intergovernmental organizatio ns are
endowed with supranationa l powers. In every international inst itution, how-
ever, th ere can be two other form s of direct and ind ividual infringement
upon the rights of pri vate persons.
aal O n the one hand, disputes arise during the implementation period
of a contract betwee n an organizati on and an extern al (private) person wh ich
is governed by municipal law," often by the law of the country where the
headquarters of th e insritu eion is located andlor wh ere it is domiciled ." For
instance, the organization does not effeet contractu a11y owed payments wh at-
ever the reasons may be.<U The internal law of an internatio nal institutio n does
only exceptionally provide fo r th e jurisdiction of its own tribunal in such
cases" not th e least because its decision would be bind ing only for a11 of its
rechtswidrigen nationalen Verwa ltungsakten. Baden-Baden 1982, 267-272, deals only with
the status of nationals of member Stau s.
U See, C. W;lfr~d / mks, The Proper Law of International Organizations, London 1962,
133- 227.
.... er. th e lucid study of Finn Seyerned, Applicable Law and Competent Courts in
Relation Berween Intergovernmental Organizat ions and Private Part ies, in: RdC val. 122
(1967 III), 427-616 (462- 611) ; also Frederick Alexander Mann, International Corporations
and National Law, in: British Yearbook of International Law (BYIL) vol. 042 (1967), 1045-
174 (150); Boweu (nore 38), 366-371. The jurisdictional com petence of munieipal courts may
be existing especially in cases of individual labour or werk contracts; see, e. g., ehe judgmene
no. 2054 of the Italian Court of Cassation dated June 5, 1976, in: Riv ista di diritto inter-
naaiona le vol. 49 (1976), 824-828.
45 A "commercial excepticn" as in thc case of similar Sta re activities can hardly be
presumed here, beeause a distinetion bet ween acta iere imperii and acta iure gestionis would
not work in respect of the functioning of international organizarions, as was expla ined onee
more in arecent litigarion between th e International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in U.S. Federal cocrts, in:
Federal Reporter Supplement vol. 477 (1979), 553 (Eastern Distriet California), affirmed on
other grounds, in: Federal Reporter 2nd series vol. 649 (1981), 1354 (9th C ircuit), certiorari
denied, in: United Stares Supreme Court Reports vol. 0454 (1982), 1163 ; see, e. g., Da fJid A .
Brittenham, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commereial Activity : A Conflicts Approach, in:
Columbia law Review vol. 83 (1983), 1440-1512 (104404- 1451, and 1508-1510); Law rence
Crodeer. The Suit against OPEC : Foreign Sovereign Immunity in rhe United Stares, in:
ICLQ vol. 29 (1980), 508-510.
-46 Th e Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International lahour Organization
(Il O) is providing for hearings and judgments also in relar ion to those confliets arising out
of contracts conc1uded by the IlO (arr. 11 [4] ); ci .. [ enks (note 43),244 ; Sdiermers {note 25),
640; Sridl-Hohenueldem (nore 25), 194; Seyersttd (note 44), 600-604; also, by the same
author: Settlement of Internal Disputes of Inte rgov em menta l Organizations by In tera al and
Externat Courts, in: ZaöRV vol. 24 (1964), 1-121 (45- 46).
organs." Often, however, organizations are obliged by their diarters to take
any neeessary measures for a settlement of the type of dispures mentioned
earlier." Th is solurion eould be reali zed, e. g., by agreeing to insert some
arbitration clause into contracts on procurement or on similar matters," but
also by declaring an explieit and prior waiver of immunity." The capacity
of intergovernmental entities to make use of stipulations like these may not
explieitly be establ ished in norms of a primary law diaracrer," but it
certainly belongs to their inherent powers. Notwithstanding such a con-
tractual agreement, the organization might later on refuse to telerate the
exeeution of an arbitral award or of a judgment, claiming a possible encroadi-
ment upon its privileges and immunities." A cautious conduct of the other
contracting party would then have been in vain if its horne Stare would not
be allowed to exercise diplomatic protection on its behalf.
bb) Unlawful acts of intergovernmental organs ean neither be excluded
from happening within the intemal field of an organization's activities, ;. e,
in the relationship berween an entity and its staff members. It is true, that
eadi work contract is entered into voluntarily on both sides, and no applicant
is bound to join an organization. But it does not necessarily follow from this
absence of coercion that members of the personnel want to aecept any acts of
the organization even with respect to ehose cases where their status would be
profoundly affected." It remains open to eadi employee to take counter-
41 The fact that the supreme organ did not implemenr the judicial order ro effeet funher
payments to the peritioners as happened cnce in tbe -Mayras - case (judgments DOS. 24-36
of the Administrative Tribunal of ehe League of Nations, of February 28, 1946), seems to
have been a singular event ; for more details on this exceptional case, see, Micharl B. Akrhunt.
The Law Governing Employment in International Organisations, Cambridge 1967, 210-214.
48 For a typical example of the insrinnional pracrice, see, arr. 29 (a) of the General
Convention on the Peivileges and Immunities of ehe United Nations' of February 13, 1946
(BGBI. 1980 vol. 11,943); cf., Bowett {note 38), 375; Seidl-Hohenveldern (nnte 25), 285.
411 Ci., arts. 181 of the EEC, 153 of the EAC, 42 of the ECSC Treaties, and Hans-Wolfram
Daig, Art. 181, in: Von der Groeben et al. (ncte 35), 290-294 (291); see also Herbett Miehsler,
Qualifikation und Anwendungsbereich des internen Rechts internationaler Organisationen, in:
BerGesVR vol. 12 (1973) , 47-83 (59 and 67).
50 Sehermers (nnte 25), 640; lenk. (note 43),228-229; Dahm (note 4), vol. 11: 93.
51 This is because they are endowed with legal personality by virtue of rnunicipal law as
weil. For general comments on this stat us, see, Schermen {ncte 25), 633-637; Hahn {nore 24),
23-24 ; Dahm (note 4), vol. 11: 8; Seid/-Hohenve/dern (note 25), 44-50; Köck I Fiseher
(not e 26), 250 and 387.
:i2 Cf., ]enks (aote 43), 239 ; Dahm (noce 4), vol. 11: 91. If, as rnay be the case in respect
of ehe European Communities, its Court of juseice would render such adecision, an execurion
against Community ergans seems possible, as clearly stated in arts. 187, 192 (1) of rhe EEC
Treary and in art, 1 of the Protoccl on Privileges ; Hans .Wolfram Daig, Art. 187, in: Von der
Groeben etal. (note 35), 310-312 (311-312) ; see also the commentary on art. 192 by the
same author, in: op. cit., 391-406 (397), and Constantinesro [note 31), 908.
" For the same view, see also, Michael B. AkehuTst, Unilateral Amendment of Conditions
of Employment in International Organizarlons, in: BYIL vol. 40 (1964), 286-335 (298-299);
measures in respect of any termination of his staH membership as ' weil as
relating to modifications of i15 terms and conditions." In the law applicable
to the staff of international institutions, therefore, provisions may be found
everywhere"" dealing with the establishment of a kind of supranational
administrative court which is endowed with the specific task of proteering
staff members against illegal acts of an organization in personnel matters, 11Ie
substantially limited scope of review those tribunals are allowed to perform.
will certainly not always satisfy the wishes of the employee seeking judicial
redress by virtue of their controlling activities." In these cases, too, an appli-
cant may ask hirnself, when his petition was rejected by the appeals ' board or
if that board's decision was not followed by remedial action of the other
organs of an institution," whether "his" horne Stare would be willing to
protect its interests which were injured because of the denial and thereby also
proteer the rights of its national.
4. In general, only reactive means of diplomatic protection will be possible
in respect of correcting the unlawful conduct of Stares and of intergovern-
mental organizations, since at an earlier date, neither the behaviour considered
as illegal in a given case nor i15 violation of public international law can be
recognized and interpreted sufficiently. With respect to those decisions of
specific organs of intergovernmental institutions wh ich are composed of
representatives of each member State" and where a rule of unanimity has been
see, moreover, Gram/ich {note 39), 408, and BVerfGE vol , 59 (1982), 91. Contrary opinions
are held by Seidl-Hobenoeldern (note 37), 617; Tomssdrat (nore 25), 18.
54 For a more detailed elaborarion, see, Alain Plantey, Droit er pra tique de la Foncricn
publique internationale , Paris 19n, 81-91; a similar view was held alread y by Dahm
(note 4), vol. 11: 81-82.
6$ See panicularly ehe recenr study by Alain Pellet , Les voies de recours ouvertes aux
fonctionnaires intemationaux, in: RGDIP vol. 85 (1981), 253-312, and 657-792 ; also
Plantey (note 54) , 423-456.
SI ct.. the profound evaluation in the first judgment rendered by the newly constituted
World Bank Administrative Tribunal (for general ' comments on this Institution, see, C. F.
Amerasinghe, The Worid Bank Administrative Tribunal, in: IClQ vcl . 31 [1982] , 748-760,
where the Starute of ehe Tribunal has been reprinted in ehe annex, 760-764): de Merod~
et al. v, Tbe World Bank, World Bank Administrative Tribunal Reports 1981, no. 1. For
comments on this landmark decision, see, Emmanuel Decaux, ]urisprudence du Tribunal
Administratif de la Banque Mondiale, in: AFDI vol. 27 (1981), 362-381; DaviJ Ruzi; , Le
pouvoir des organisations internationales de modifier unilateralement la condition juridique des
foncr ionnaires intemationaux - Droits acquis ou droits essentiels, in : Journal du droit inter-
national vol. 109 (1982), 421-436; C. F. Ameresingbe, The Implications of the de Merode
Case for International Administrative Law, in: ZaöRV vol. 43 (1983) , 1-48.
S7 See, supra, ncte 47; more details on those events are given in Suzanne Bastid , Les tr ibu-
naux adminisuat ifs internationaux et leur jurisprudence, in: RdC vol. 92 (1957 11), 3-43-517
(373- 376); Akehurst {note 53), 305-308.
58 On the division of functions in international organizations, see, Hahn (note 24), 51-1 00;
cf., already the Hague lecture by the same author: Constitutional Limitations in rhe Law
01 the European Organisation" in: RdC vol. 108 (1963 I), 189-306 (211-241).
stipulated" or where such a procedure is being praetised regularly", the right
to exereise diplomatie proteetion eould be used by way of vetoing each time
a final voting takes place. Thereby the representative of ahorne Stare would be
able to prevent an illegal act by hindering its eoming into existenee. Third
Stares, however, can not behave in thi s manner. O n the other hand, the y are by
no means restrained fro m exhausting any possibilities of influeneing th e
decision-making process within an institution, as long as those acrivities remain
within the framework of normal diplomatic eonduet and do not beeome an
unlawful intervention into the internal aHairs of an organization."
II . D ip 10m a t i c Pr o t e c t i o n
Agai n st Ae t s of Inter governmental Or g an s
Under Publ ie Intern at ional Law
1. Th e legal existenee of Stare rights in th is area is both a preeondit ion of
and a limitati on upon an individual's right in munieipallaw to th e exereise of
dipl omatie protection on that person's behalf aga inst foreign publie autho-
rities, sinee no person ean be entitled to claim a eonduet of "his" State wh idi
is prohibited under publie internationallaw."
a) Th e relationsh ip between a sovereign entity and an intergovernmental
orga nization may well diHer in va rious aspeets from relations between
Stare subjects of publie internation al law, particularly in the instance of
non-member Stares. A reeognition of international personality by an y th ird
State is not merely a declaratory act, but rather a const itutive one,es and
norms of an organization whether derived from the treaty establishing the
inst itution, or enacted by its organs, are bind ing upon no other international
persons th an the partieipating subjeets of publie inte rnational law, at least in
1111 Same examples oI this rule are given by Schermers (noce 25), 327-329 ; Bowett (nc te
38), 401-404; Seidl-Hab..oeldern (ncte 25), 139-140.
60 The conclusion oE the Luxembourg agreement cf ]anuary 29, 1966 has almest mad e
obsolete the majority provisions which were laid down in art . 148 oI the EEC Treaty; cf.,
Hermann Mosler, National- und Gemeinschaftsinteressen im Verfahren des EWG~Minister~
rares, in: ZaöRV vol. 26 (1966), 1-.8 (27- 28); Michatl Sdnueitzer, Die Stellung der
Luxemburger Vereinbarung im Europäischen Geme inschaftsrecht, in: Franz Burkei I Dirk-Meints
Polter (eds.), Rechtsfr agen im Spektrum des öffentlichen, Festsmrift H ub ert Armbruster. Berlin
1976, 75-94 (80-94).
11 1 Weng /er (note 42), 1292 and 1294, holds the rule of non- intervent ion to be inapplicable
in those instances; a similar view is also held by Dahm (noee 4). vo l. H: 88; Seidi-Ho ben-
oeldern (note 25) . 86.
12 Hatschek (note 8). 401-402 ; also Wi/helm Kerl Geck. Der Anspruch des Staatsbürgers
auf Schutz gegenüber dem Ausland nach deutschem Recht. in: ZaöRV vol. 17 (1956/57).
476-533 (490) ; Daebring (note 5), 16-17; Dabm (note 4), vo!.l: 524.
13 Seidl-Hobenveldern (note 25), 81-82; Broumlie (note 14), 691; Wengler (note 42),
1238-1239; but see also Köde I Fischer (note 26), 388- 389 and 396.
prineiple." Such divergenees are based primarily on the lack of territorial
sovereignty of these funetional subjeets of int ernational law, but it seems
nonetheless possible to presume that there does exist in law a right to
diplomati e proteenon also against intergovernm ental organizat ions" , as weil
as a similar cornpetence of these organizations themselves in cases where
the rights of those ent ities will be eneroached upon." It may eertainly be
somewhat diffieult to ment ion more than a few eases of Stare practice when
arguing the existenee of the right to exereise diplomatie protection , But the
basic preconditio ns for its reeognition seem to be fulfilled, at least in situations
like rhose deseribed above, in the same manner as if the publie act which is
the object of an appeal had been performed by a fore ign Stare (organ). An
intergovernmental organiz at ion is an integra l part of the system of publie
international law and therefore bound to abide by its norms . Its acts may
therefore be eontrary to orders or prohibirions incorporated into general
publie interna tional law, wh ich are therefore of a superior rank. N evertheless
even such unlawful condu ce may often be imputable tO that enti ry. Institu-
tional aets are founded on the autonomous law of a partieular organiz ation.
They are acts of a fo reign publie authority also From th e viewpoint of the
relat ionship between the entity's legal system and the legal orders of member
Stares, sinee the partieipation of these countries in establishing an organization
does not result in a "munieipalization" of its aets of a secondary law charaeter;
these do not beeome the law of a member Stare in any respece." Finally, the
exereising of diplomatie protection by a State also has a legal foundation in its
personal sovereignt y over all of its nationals, and that cap acity does not
depend on any territorial links . Tberefore an infringement upon rights need
not be created by the behaviour of a fore ign Stare, it mayaIso be eaused by
some other eneroachment upon the sovereign "competence personelle" which
seeks for compensat ion in a similar way.
b) It is not a neeessary conclusion from the availability of means of
diplomat ic protection also against intergovernmental organs, that the rules
applieable in these eireumstanees wou ld be exaetly the same which govern
.. MithsI" (noee 49), 71>-77; Ha hn (nott 24), 112-113; Mtng (note 24), 61.
... See, Gtck (note 6), 385-386; Dahm (eoee 4), vol.lII : 276- 278; and also th e Hague
lecture of Clydt Eaglelon, International Organization and the Law of Responsibiliry, in :
aac vol. 76 (1950 I), 319-423 (385- 387).
•• Foe the same view, see also, e, g., Köck I Fischt r (note 26), 397; Bowett (note 38), 340
and 362; Cbrisloph Schrcuer, Internationale Organisationen, in: H ans-Peter Neu baU I Walde-
tn4T Hummer I Cb risloph Scbrtuer (eds.), Osterreichisehes Handbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. 1,
Wien 1983, 154-183 (160).
" Bembardt (note 26), 22; see also BVe, fGE vol. 22 (1968), 293- 299 (296), and supra .
note 25.
reaetions against foreign Stare persons." First of all, there seem to be many
reasons for drawing a clear disrinction between Stare members of an orga niza-
tion and those other subjects of international law which do not belong t O the
international inst irution at issue. In relation to these third Stares, there would
probably arise only one major diffieulty, namely whether the y are obliged
to use any available remedies of ehe insti tu tional legal order befo re reverting
to other means of dipl ornatic prot eetion. Until now, such a proeedure has
only ra rely been provided." Th ird Stares therefor e are hardly bound to
restriet themselves when exereising diplornatic protection as long as they act in
due respeet of genera l prineiples of publie international law, such as the
prohibition tO use force in international relat ions." A mere normative offe ring
of remedies by an intergovern rnenral insritur ion wirhin its legal framework
would, moreover, only enable, but by no means oblige, an exte rnal inter-
national person to make use of this possibility for an insrit utionalized judieial
settlement ." Th e rule of prior exhau stion of loeal remedies may possibly be
extended to the use of inrra -insritutio nal procedures fo r resolving (legal)
eonfliets, but it is certai n thae only individual persons have to eomply with
this precondition," and there is no such neeessity in respeet of foreign Sta tes.
These entities may however volu ntarily waive their sovereign immunities and
aeeept the jurisdiction of any other Stares."
&8 But there must be a link of na rionality in borh casesj cj ., e. g" Broumlie {note 14),
401-402 and 480-495; Berber (not. 15),21 ; V ahm (not. 4), vol . 11l, 247-253.
,It Th e concept of "physical or legal per sons" as used in art , 173 (2) of the EEC Treary
incIudes, however, not only nationals of member Stares, but also Foreigners (and non-resi-
denes), and moreover alt person s incorporated by virtue of non-Communiry, i, e. fore ign
domestic or public international law systems; see, Daig, Art. 173, in : Von der Groeben et al .
{ncte 35), 222-223. Cf. for a more recent study Luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea Ccnven-
tion and Third Stares, in: A]IL vol. 77 (1983), 541-568 (543 en d 550) arguing that ehe
provisions of ehe United N ations' Convention on the Law of the Sea (reprinted in: ILM
vol. 21 [1982], 1261-1345) were clearly inrended to be applicable to Stares Parries only ;
for a somewhat different posieion , see, Rudo lf Bernhardt, Die Streitbeilegung im Rahmen der
Neuordnung des Seerechts, in: ZaöRV vol. 38 (1978), 959- 982 (964 n. 6).
70 Dahm [note 4), vol. 111 : 266-267.
7 1 The same view is also held by Wengler {note 42), 1298, and (probabty) Dahm (note 4),
vol. 11 , 278.
7Z Verdross I Simma (note 15), 637; Berber (note 15), 22; Broumlie {nore 14), 496; also
Dahm (ooce 4), vol. 111 : 261, and the special case ment ioned by Ignaz Seidl-Ho benve ldern,
Die völkerrechtliche Haftung für Handlungen internationaler Organisationen im Verhältnis
zu Nichtmit gliedsta aten, in: Osterreichische Zeitschrift für öffentlidtes Recht (OZöR) vol. 11
(1961), 497-506 (505).
73 lf an organ of a (Fc reign) State which has been endowe d with .its own legal personal ity
were injured, one might decide othe rwise, as th is entiry cannot successfully plead immunity
ratione personae, c/ ., Ludw ig Gramlich, Staatliche Immunität für Zentralbanken?, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift vol. 45 (1981), 545-603 (579- 580), and more recentl y BVcrfGE vol. 64 (1984),
1- 46 (44-45), ann otare d by Ignaz Seidl-Hobmoeldem, iru RI W!AWD vol. 29 (1983), 613
-615.
e) If Stare organs are eonsidering the exereise of diplornatic protection on
behalf of nationals against aets of an intergovernmental organization whose
member that Star e is, th is special relationship entered into eonseiously and at
free will eannot be without signifieanee in respeet of the existenee as weil
as the use of a right to diplomatic proteceion. Ir follows already from general
mies of Stare intercourse that each internationa l person may dispose of its
right(s) under publie international law." Ir cannot be denied that the inst ru-
ments establishing an intergovernmental organi zation and other provisions
of primary law deal only rarely with the rights of member Stares to exereise
proteetion. An exeeption the rero may, however, be seen in art. 27 of the
World Bank "Convention on the settlement of investment disputes berween
States and nationals of other Stares"." By virtue of this norm, contract ing
parties which are also horne Stares of investors are excluded from protective
acts other than mere informal diplomatie exchanges for the sole purpose of
facilitating a settlement of the dispute" as long as the host Stare partieipating
in conciliation or arbitration procedures in a given case does not Fail to abide
by, and comply with, the award rendered in such a dispure under the Con-
vention."
Furthermore, there does exist a sirnilar regime for eonfliet resolution wirhin
the framework of bilateral investment proteetion treaties. In th is context, too,
a State's right to exereise diplomaric protection is revived if the deeisions
rendered by an arbirral tr ibunal having been established by agreement of all
part ies would remain a dead letter beeause of non-compliance with its orders
by the aggrieved sovereign ent ity.18 Certainly it eannot be overlooked that
such a suspension of other means of protection seems to fit preeisely for situ-
ations relating to international investments, and that the exclusivity of the
7. Berber (noee 15), 24; Dahm (note 4) vol. 111 : 260.
711 Of Feh. 18, 1965, in : Un ited Nations Treaty Series vol. 575 (1966), 159-235; on
art. 27 of this agreement : see, in parricular, Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other Stares, in: RdC vol . 136
(1972 11), 331-404 (371-380); Georges R. Delaume. Le Cent re international pour le
reglement des dif ferends relaeifs aux invesrissements (CIRD I), in: Journal du Droh Inter-
n..icnal vol. 109 (t 982), 775-843 (840-841).
7t Art. 27 (2) may be merely declarator y since nonnalty "inform al diplomatie exchanges
for the sole purpese of Facilitaring a setrlement of disputes" will not (yet) be able to affect
the sovereignty of the other Stare party, ci., Bromes (note 75), 375.
77 Similar resrrict ions may result from taking dispur es (0 th e International Sea-Bed Dis-
putes Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, in conformity with arr. 187 (2) lits. (b},
(c) of the Law of the Sea Convendon: on this special kind of judicial competence, see,
BnnharJt (note 69). 977-978; Günther jaenicJu , Dispute Settl ement under ehe Con ven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, in : Z. öRV vol. 43 (1983), 813-827 (820-821).
78 Ci ., e, g., Foeth (noce 12), 259-260; H elmut Fride, Bilateraler Investitionsschutz in
Entwicklungsländern , Berlin 1975. 236-237; Reinhard Patzina , Rechtlicher Schutz ausl än-
diseher Privatinvestoren gegen Enteignungsrisiken in Entwicklungsländern, H eidelberg, Harn-
burg 1981, 117-118.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) remedies
is based on a twofold consent given by the host Stare." A restrietion in
exercising diplomatie protection by virtue of, and according to, an institutional
legal order is, however, to be applied within a much broader framework: By
participating in the establishment of an international organization, i. e, by
approving the legislative as weil as the administrative functions of inter-
governmental organs, their scope and rheir substance, the member States will be
bound at least insofar, as the countermeasures available to them against unlaw-
ful act ivities of the organization concerned are reduced to attacking those acts
wirhin the procedural framework provided for by the institutional legal
order." The previous consent referring to the ordinary kind of behaviour of
each organ is both related to its various tasks as laid down in the convention
establishing it, and to different modes of activities which are entrusted to the
main organs." From the viewpoint of the members of an organization, only
acts beyond the powers of an organ, whether explicidy stated or recognized
otherwise, may give rise ro a legal attack on its validity. Seen more generally,
however, it can hardly be assumed that each member Stare is ent ided to treat
insti rurional acts as ultra oires and therefore not valid, if not as being alto-
gerher null and void just because it is his free and sovereign will to do so." If
any possibilities of control and rectification are laid down in the law of an
intergovernmental organization, the mernbership link entered into in con-
formity with public intern ational law includes a binding obligation upon the
participant always to take recourse to such remedies and by no means to
10 For more details, see, Broches (note 75), J52-JSSi John K . Ryans, Ir. I fames C. Baker,
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in: ]WTL vol. 10 (1976),
65-79 (67).
80 This concentrarion effece is explicitly provided for in primary European Community
law, see, arts. 219 of the EEe, 193 of the EAC, 870f the EeSe Treaties, and also [psen
{note 31), 238 ; Jochen Thiesing, Art. 219, in: Von der Groeben et al. (noce 35), 617-619
(618). Ci., for the same concept, art, 33 (1) of the Treaty Creating the Court of justice
of the Cartagena Agreement (i. e.• Andean Group) of May 28. 1979, reprinted in: ILM vcl.
18 (1979), 1203-1210.
81 Ci., e. g.• Konrad Ginther, Mitgliedschaft in Internationalen Organisationen-Grundfra-
gen, in: BerGesVR vol. 17 (1975), 7-52 (21- 22); Hermann Moeler, Internationale Organi-
sation und Staatsverfassung, in: Walter Schätzel I Hans·Jiirgen Schlochauer (005.). Rechts-
fragen der Internationalen Organisation. Festschrift Hans Wehberg . FrankfurtIM. 1956,
273-300 (284); also Aubin (nore 42), 270; Ign4z Seidl-Hobmveldem. book review, in:
öZöRV vol. 34 (1983), 282-283 (283), Wmur Mmg , Book Review, in: Z.öRV vol. 43
(1983), 620- 621 (621).
81 Bemberdt (note 26), 32-34; cf . also, Hans-Jiirgen Schlochauer. Der Rechtsschutz gegen-
über der Tätigkeit internationaler und übernationaler Behörden, FrankfuetlM. 1952. 24-25;
Wilhelm WengIer. Reeours judiciaire a insrituer contre les decisions d'organes internationaux,
in: Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droie Intemational vol. 44 I (1952). 224-291 (230-231). and
recently Ebere Ozieke. The Legal Validity of Ulua Vires Decisions of International Organi.
zaticns, in: A]IL vol. 77 (1983), 239-256 (240-241 and 255).
proceed otherwise." In exceptional cases - if, e, g., there are no statutory
rules providing for an int ra-insti tutional review of inter-governmenta l acts"
- a State pany may have disregarded impera tive norms of its own municipal
legal order", but that failure does not regularly'" diminish the legal validity
of the international components of the act establishing an organization."
Nowadays, in view of th e concept of the rule of law which is binding also for
intergovernmenta l organizations, legal deficiencies are to be found only in
the (sta ff) law of the International Monetary Fund. There is not (yet) any
administrative .tribunal with in the Fund nor have its staff members access
at least to the judges of another inst itution." A right of member Seares to
exercise diplomatie protection will nevertheless be limited to the possibility
of initiating the establishment of a judici al organ within the institution," it
83 Tbis view was held already by Louis CafJa re, Les tr ansformat ions de 1a protection
diplomatique, in: ZaöR V vol. 19 (1958), 54- 80 (78)j Fritz Münch. Interna tionale Organi-
sationen mit H oheitsrechten, in : Festsdtci ft Hans Wehberg (noee 81), 301-323 (316- 319);
Eagle/on {note 66), 412 ; A Hbin (note 42), 269-270.
8.. See, infra, note 88.
85 The (majority oE the judges of the) Federal Constitutional Court held in a landmark
decision oE May 29, 1974 that art, 24 (1) of the German Basic Law ooly allows sudr "rrans-
fees" of sovereign rights oneo international institu tions "which do (not) alter the idenriry of
the Federal Constitution by way of attaeking its essential srrucrure" , BVerfGE vol. 37
(1975), 271-305 (279). On th.is judgement, see particularly the remarks by Ernst-Wem er
Fuss, Der Grundrechtsschutz in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften aus deutscher Sicht, H eule
et al. 1975, 163-181, and !ürgen Schwarze, Das Verbälmis von deut schem Verf assungsrecht
und europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht auf dem Gebiet des Grundrechtssdrutzes im Spiegel der
jüngsten Redn sprednmg, in: Europ äische Grundredire Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) vol. 10 (1983),
117-124 (117-120).
8. It migbt be otherwise if al1 preconditions for an applicaricn of art. 46 (and are, 5) of
rhe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were fu1611ed.. This Instrument, signed at the
Austrian capital May 23, 1969, bad normat ive effccu soon afterwards at least insofar, as its
primary purpose was a codification of customary internationa l law rules in this field. Since
1980, after the necessary number of ratifications (art. 84) had been reached, the Convention
is valid as part of intern ational treary law as weil. Cf.. e, g-, Wilhelm Karl Geck, Tbe Con-
clusion of Treaties in Violation of the Intemal Law of a Party, in: ZaöRV vol. 27 (1967),
429-450 (437-450)j Stephan V erosta, Die Vertragsrechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen
1968/69 und die Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Vert räge, in: ZaöRV vol. 29 (1969),
654-710 (690-691).
81 See, bowever, 19naz Seidl-Hobmveldem, Grenzen rechtlicher Str eitbeilegung in Inter-
nationalen Organisat ionen, in : BerGesVR vol. 9 (1969), 45-75 (55-58), discussing further
possible eomplieations from the viewpoint of member States .
88 The fund staff will perhaps soon be able tO seek redress by suits brought before the
World Bank Administrat ive Tr ibunal , tOOj see, Amira singhe (note 56), 760.
81 Ci., Bastid {note 57), 367 n. 2; Brownlie (noee 14), 505 n. 4; for a simitar vlew, see,
Münm (note 83), 318; Seidl·HohenfJelJem {nore 87), 69. Hans-Peter Ferrer, La proteeden
juridictionnelle du particulier au sein des Organisation s internat ionales, in: Hermann Mod er
(ed.), Gerichtsschutz gegen die Exekutive, vol. II and III, Köln, Berlin 1970-1971, 1217-
1258 (1258) argues that in each case in which an organizat ion is not able to provide for
adequate judicial proteeden on behalf of in staff members, the injured person can take
reccurse tO the assistance of his home Stare and ask for its help by diplomatie means.
will hardly entitle a eontraeting party to direce interference in an organization's
aHairs. The member country is bound not to behave in eontradietion with i15
own previous eonduet as expressed by eonsenting tO the entity's charter." It
has to respeet an obligation that one may perhaps deseribe as "inst itutional
Ioyality"." Finally, a restitution of broader means of diplomatic proteetion
eould hardly be eHeeted retroaetively by leaving an intergovernmental organi-
zation, sinee the faet of having onee been a member eannot be made undone
in this way. From that moment on, however, the St"ate having lost its member-
ship status will be in the same legal position as any other third sovereign
enrity."
2. Behaviour of the other party eontrary to the norms of publie inter-
national law is a further neeessary precondition for exereising a right to
diplomatic proteetion (also against acts of an intergovernmental organization).
a) That the powers of each international institution are funetionally
limited seems to be important in this respect , Notwithstanding its tasks and
competences in a given case, no intergovernmental organization existing today
is ahle to execute its decisions by its own special organs," and coercive
implem entation must neeessarily be performed with the assistance of national
offieials, if not by organs of member States themselves." Thereby an essential
area of diplomaric protection against foreign Stares, i. e. that eoneerning
violations of individualliberties or human rights of a personal charaeter," has
IHt See ehe similar remarks by Brownlie (ncte 14), 636; for a contrary position, see, Dahm
(note 4), vol. m , 278.
111 On this equivalent [0 the concept of "federal loyalty" (BundestTtue) , cj., Bernhardt
(note 26), 38; Jochen Abraham Pro-sein, Diskussionsbeitrag, in: BerGesVR vcl . 17 (1975) ,
119-120 (120) ; Thomas Oppermann. Diskussicnsbeitrag, in: op, cit., 133-136 (134); Georg
Ren, Die Bedeutung der Redmvergleichung für das Recht internationaler Organisationen,
in: ZaöRV vol. 36 (1976), 227-279 (228-229); for specific comments in respect of the
European Communities, see, Hugo j . Hahn . Der Maßstab der internationalen Aufsicht im
Friedensvölkerredtt, in: j ahrbuch für Internationales Recht vol. 10 (1961), 2-42 (28); Mein-
hard Hilf. Sekundäres Gemeinschaftsrecht und deutsche Grundrechte - Auswirkungen auf
die Gemeinschafrsrechtscrdnung, in: ZaöRV vol. 35 (1975), 51-66 (58-59). For a denial of
the existence of such a principle, see, Lpsen (note 31), 217-218; Bengt Beutler. Die Gemein-
schaft und die Mitgliedstaaten, in: Bengt Beutler I Roland Bieber I jöm Pipkom I jochen Streil,
Die Europäische Gemeinschaft - Rechtsordnung und Politik, 2nd ed. Baden-Baden 1982,
63-97 (75).
112 See on this topic, supra, notes 68 et seq.
llS Hahn (noee 24), 119-120, and 126-128; Seidl-Hobenueldem (note 25), 299-300.
ll' Schermers (note 25), 601-604, is using a somewhat broader conception of individual
sanctions than the authors mentioned sbcve.
lllS Thar means acts encroaching upon the physical as well as the mental integriry and
measures reserlering essential personal Iiberties. In this area, ehe concept of a minimum
standerd may sooner gain some acceptance on a universal (legal) level: see, Verdross I Simma
(note 15), 588-589; but also the critical comment by Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of
Philosophie" The Filartiga Jurisprudence, im ICLQ vol. 32 (1983), 250-258.
hardly any relevanee in th e ease of intergovernmental organizar ions, Infrin ge-
ments upon property rights of natural as well as of juridieal persons, however,
seem to be a rather normal event in the course of the ordina ry funetio ning of
internat ional institutions." Bur the procedure to be followed insofar will only
exeeptionally result in eausing a violation of internat ional law rules; it will
have been estab lished just for the opposite reason, name1y to abide by those
rules.
b) Ir seems to be evident that there ean only be one limit tO th e tr eatment
of nationals of a fore ign Stare under pubI ie international Iaw, and that it is
not important which foreign entity has been responsible for an aggr ieving aet."
From the viewpoint of an individual person at least, whose legal sta tus must
be seen as a fundamental basis for its horne Stare when exereising diplomatic
protection, the nature of the publie aet rather than the precis e deseription of
the aetor's organizational posit ion will be the erueial issue. H, and insofar as
an act does not violar e rules of publie internationallaw, however, a right to
proteetion is not only superfluous, but furth ermore using it would rather be an
unlawful intervention into "dornestic affairs".t8
Certai nly, internatio nal orga nizations too are (derivative) subjects of inter-
national law, and they are eapable on behalf of that personality to break its
rules in va rious respeets (though not entitled to do so) and th ereby ean th ern-
se1ves become responsible under publie in ternational law." First of all, a
distinction must onee again be made between severaI possible adressees of their
aetivities, namely, whether tho se are nationals of third or of member Stares,
tO evaluate the Iawfulness of a eertain institutional behaviour. The horne Stares
of the individual mentioned in the first plaee are bound to aeeept the
responsibility of the entity - instead of that of the participating countries -
for an encroachment upon their rights only in those eases in which they
previously reeognized its legal existence under the Iaw of nations at least by
" European Community law, to eile only ODe example, provides for sanetions of a pecu-
niary dta racte r in some cases of illegal behaviour (cf. arts. 58 [4] , 59 [7] , 64 of the EeSe
Treary, and art . 15 of the Council Regulation N o. 17 of February 6. 1962), bue there are
also certain Darms, particularly in the field of agricul rure, authorizing several interventionist
measures, i. e. subsidies or similar financial assistance. These, bowever, may give rise ( 0 pro-
tests by thcse marker participants wbo da not sbare in those benefits.
17 See also, Wengier (note 42). 1284 and 1285.
• 8 Larin American jur isrs dealt with this relationship in the mosr lucid manner; see also
Njcolaj A. Ouchakcw . La competence interne des Etats ee la non-interventi on dans le droit
international contemporain, in: RdC vol. 141 (197-4 I), 1-86 (56- 57).
" Ci ., the classification by Francisco V. Garcie-A mador, Stare Responsibility - Same
New Problems. in : RdC vol. 94 (1958 11). 365-487 (409- 413). and some essential arguments
developed by Eagleton (note 66). 401-404.
implication.':" If they did so, however, they are no Ionger permitted to pierce
the veil of the organization's personality, and they are neither allowed to
claim the international responsibility of the Stare of the institutional head-
quarters?" nor that of (any of its) member States."· It must be conceded
however, that even after an act of recognition has taken place, the inter-
national unlawfulness of the organization's conduct may be looked at
differendy, when seen from the perspective of a third Stare rather than from
that of a member country, or there may at least be different ways for counter-
acting violations of Srate rights.
c) In both instances, an assumption of iIIegality has ro be founded on
specific international law obligations governing the activities of an organi-
zation in a given case. These may result from norms of its own legal order
which rank superior within the hierarchy of internal institutional law than the
acts whose lawfulness is at issue. In particular, those provisions must either be
formally included within the treaty establishing an organization or at least
be regarded as primary law norms because of their substance.'" As to their
contents , such deficiencies within the intra-institutional chain of legitimacy
are to be found mainly in procedural deficits'" or in irregularities resulting
from the misperception of essentially restricted competences of an organ.'"
Charters of intergovernmental organizations, however, most often refrain
from stipulating any detailed rules on the degree of intervention which should
not be overstepped in the relations berween an organ entided to perform
certain exacdy defined activities and the individual persons aimed at thereby:
The primary law norms of international organizations have been somewhat
100 If ODeconsiders the International Court of justice tO have said anything contrary eo this
in its Advisory Opinion on "Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations" (I.c.]. Reports 1949, 174-220 [180 and 184]), then those dicta must be interpreted
as c1early aimed solely at the srarus of the world organizarion; Seidl-Hohenveldern (note 25),
81-82 ; GeoTg Sdnoarzenberger, International Constitutional Law, · London 1976, 33-34;
Bowelt (ncte 38), 336-337.
101 This possibiliry is often explicitly excluded by the norms of an international treary, U .
for example, by sec. 46 of the Convention berween Awtria and the International Atomic
Energy Agency of December 11, 1957 (Austrian Journal of Federal Statutes no. 82 of 1958).
102 Seidl-Hohenueldem (note 25), 82-84; id. (noce 72), 502-503; Wmgl~r (nore 42).
1296-1301.
103 Bembardt (note 26), 29.
104 The division of powers (or better r functions) wirhin international institutions is often
implemented by way of various co-operative procedures involving some or alt ergans of
that entiry for the purposes of preparing and taking decisions, see, Hahn (noce 24), 36-41-
For the situation in respect to the relevant provisions on international seaff, see the survey
by Akehurst (note 47), 166-196.
105 Insofar, the doctrine of "inherent" or "implied powers" of international organizations
only closes minor gaps, but ir can hardly justify any major extension of organizational
powers, neither in a venical nor in a horizontal direction, see, Seidl-Hobenoeldem (noce 25).
233-234.
different from munieipal prOVlSlons on eonstitutionally guaranteed human
rights unti l now insofar, as there are no such sets of rules wirhin the charters of
these institutions, and any declarations of one or more of their orga ns upon
human rights pol ieies to be implemented as oeeurred in the ease of the Euro-
pean Communities some years ago"< ean hardly fill this gap , not least beeause
of their lack of legal prec ision.!"
Moreover there do not exist any external eontraetual obligations to respeet
the rights of individuals. Insofar as covenants For the protection of human
rights have been agreed upon at an internationallaw level"", only Stares have
been eontraeting parties'" until now, as weil as eertain specifie addresseesof the
provisions of these instruments.HO Intergovernmental organizations are not
directlyt" bound by them, even in those eases when their organs were
participating in working out the relevant conventions.v"
100 See the Common Declaration made by the Pa rliament, Council and Commission of
the European Communities April 5, 1977 (Official Journal of the European Communities
1977, C 103, 1); on this docum ent, see, e. g•• Meinhard Hilf . Die gemeinsame Grundrechts-
erklärung . ..• in: EuGR Z vol. 4 (1977), 158-161 ; Hans-Werner Rengeling, Die Wahl des
Europäischen Parlaments und neuere Entwicklun gen im europä ischen Gemeinschafts recht, in:
Offentl ime Verwa ltung (DöV) vol. 30 (1977), 622-626 (625); also [o dsen Streit , Rechts-
schutzsystem, in : Bewtler t t 41. (note 91),191-252 (198- 200); Schwarze (nore 85), 120-1204.
107 For this view, see, Ludw ig Gram/ich, Europäische Zentralbank und Art. 24 Abs. 1 GG,
Baden-Baden 1979, 158.
108 Cf. for a. reeent opinion Sir Gtrald Fitzmauriu, Some Reflections on the Europea.n
Convention on Human Rights - a.nd on Human Rights, in : RuJo/f Bernbardt I Wi lhdm Kar/
Gtck I Günther / amickt I Helm xt Stt inbergtr (eds.), völkerreche als Rechtsordnung - Inter-
nationale Gerichtsbarkeit - Menschenrechte, Festschrift H ermann Mosler, Berlin et al, 1983,
203-219 (205-211); see also the African Charte r of H uman and Peoples' Rights, signed at
Banjul in 1981, reprinred in : ILM vol. 21 (1982), 59-68.
lot See, e. g., arts. 48 resp. 26 of the United Nations' Convenants (1966), art; 66 of ehe
European Convention for the Proteetion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950), art. 74 of the Amer ican Convention on Human Rights (1969), art, 63 of the Banjul
Charter (1981). Cj.; however, Giuseppe Sperduti, Commen t concevoir, dans sa specificlee,
l'adhesion des Comrnunautes europee nnes a la Convention de Rome sur la sauvegarde des
Drcits de l'Homme et des Iiberres fondamentales, in : Festschrift Hermann Mos/er (note 108),
903-907; Rudolf Bembardt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft als neuer Rechtst räger im Geflecht
der traditionellen zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, in : Europarecht (EuR) vol. 18 (1983),
199-215 (214- 215).
110 The "Universal Deelaration of Human Rights" as promulgated by resolution 217 (IH)
of the United Nat ions' General Assembly which is aimed at Sta res as weil as at individual
persons is not held tO be a legal inst rument in a narrow lSt11Se, but rather acefleet ion of
moral values. I t is legally binding only if, and insofar, as a.ny of its norms have become
customary international law; cf. , Otto Kimmin ich, Die allgemeinen Menschenrecht e in den
Ost.West-Beziehungen, in: Internationales Recht und Diplomatie 19n-1980, 29-38 (31-
32); Broum lie (note 104),570-571 ; Sitgfried Magiera, völkerrecbessubjekte, in : Menul/ Ip5m
(noee 26), 97- 135 (123).
111 For the indirect legal effeet s, see, supra, note 110, and also Seidi-Hobenoeldem (note
25), 226 and 252.
l U As happened, for instance, in the case of the U. N . convenants which were the result
of General Assembly activities (see its Resolution 2200 [X XI] of Dec. 19, 1966) or in the case
Recently, however, some international administrative tribunals, in particular
expressed the opinion that also general prineiples of law had to be taken into
aceount du ring their deeision-making process'P since those prineiples were
restricting as well as forming114 the powers of international organs, even when
not ment ioned explieitly in primary institutional law.t" Rules of eustomary
internarional law might be dealt with likewise.t" At this moment, any further
profound inquiry into the features of institutional normativity, and in parti-
eular into the seope of international law limitations for the internal law of
international institutions, seems neither possible nor necessary, at least in
this eontext: In each situation in which the existence of a right to exereising
diplomatic protection against publie aets of intergovernmental organizations
will be at issue, a c1ear distinetion ean always be drawn between two different
solutions.
First, the doubtful eonduet of an organ is unlawful in respeet of the auto-
nomous institutional legal order - then it ean and must be eorreeted within
this normative framework alone, already in the interest of the well-functioning
and effeetiveness of the organization, Therefore, for those cases it seems to be
only the second-best solution to enable only the individual directly aggrieved
of the European Convention on Human Rights which originated from the work of organs
of ehe Couneil of Europe (on this latter develcpment, see, Heinz Guradze, Die Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention - Kommentar, Köln 1968, 2-5). But see also Bastid (note 57) .
478, on the somewhat ambiguous jurisprudence of ehe United Nations' Administrative Tribu-
nal in this field, and, more recendy, Shigeki Miyazaki. Internationaler Schutz der Menschen-
rechte und Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit, in: Festschrift Herrnann Mosler (note 108), 581-597
(595-597).
113 On this topic, see particularly the studies of Amerasinghe (note 56) , 25-29, and of
Claudette Apprill, La norion de "droit acquis" dans le droit de 130 fonetion publique inter-
nationale - Regard sur le droit positif, in: RGDIP vol. 87 (1983) , 315-358j but cj., Bastid
(note 57), 478-487j Akehurst (note 47) , 72-83 ; Michael Botbe, Die Bedeutung der Rechts-
vergleichung in der Praxis internationaler Gerichte, in: ZaöRV vol. 36 (1976) , 280-299
(292-298).
114 Cf., e. g.• Hans W . Baade, The Acquired Rights of International Public Servante, in:
AJCL vol. 15 (1966/67), 251-300 (277-300) : Felice Morgenstern , 10e Law Applicable to
International Officials, in: ICLQ vol. 18 (1969) , 739-756 (741-746) ; also. more generally,
Ko Swan Sik, The Concept of Acquired Rights in International Law, in: Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review vol. 24 (1977), 120-142.
116 This has been effected in arts. 215 (2) of the EEC and 188 (2) of ehe EAC Treaties,
relating to non-contractual liability of ehe Communities for damage done in the exercise of
official duties. For further details, see, Meng (noee 24), 99-101 ; BlecJemann (nore 29).
196-199 ; Constantinesco (note 31), 815-818 and 891-893.
tU Same dicta of the International Court of Justice in "Effect of Awards of Compen-
sation made by ehe U. N . Administrative Tribunal", Advisory Opinion of July 13th 1954:
I.C.J. Reports 1954, 47-97 (91) referring to a former judgment in the Colombian-Peruvian
asylum case (Judgment of November 20th, 1950 : I.C.]. Reports 1950, 266-389 [277]:
ci. also Brownlie [note 14], 6-7) may be understcod in this sense. See for a more detailed
elaboraeion, Albert Bleckmann, Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für inter-
nationale Organisationen, in: ZaöRV vol. 37 (1977). 107-121 (113-121) .
to seek redress, At least in respect of any future alterations of the law, the
rule of efficiency!" would require the stipulation of subrogation rigbts of the
horne State,1t8 or even broader and rnore encompass ing remedies.v" The law
of the European Communities bas probably already fulfilled rhis precon-
dition.1!O
Seeond, tbe institutional aet did not exeeed the limits of the organization's
legal order : Then its drarter alone is to be taken into aeeount as the (possible)
souree of ilIegality under publie internat ional law.!" Sinee it may be assumed
that prior 'consent excludes the international responsibility of the aetor whose
charter has been eonsented to, the legitimaey and lawfulness of primary
institutionallaw ean hardly be ealled into question by a member Stare, at least
if its supreme organs are not probibited by law from leaving the organi-
zation.!" Befare recognizing an international organization as a new member
of the internat ional community, a third State or any other entity endowed
with international personaliry will not be prevented either from identifying
that organization's aetivities with that of one or all of its member Stares,
instead of pereeiving them as acts of the inst iturion itself - or from then
reviewing such (Stare) eonduet with regard to its legality under the law of
nations.'" But also after the reeognition has taken place, it ean hardly be
117 On its sccpe of application (also beyend the area of international institutional law) ,
see rhe still impo rt ant study by Herbert K riigcr, Das Prinzip der Effekt ivit ät. oder: Ober die
besondere WirklidtkeiuDiihe des Völkerredtu. in: Dimitri S. Constantopoulus I Constantin Th.
Elistathi4Jes I Charalambos N . Fragistas (eds.), Grundprobleme des internat ionalen Rechts,
Festsdrrift l t an Spiropoulos, Bonn 1957, 265-284.
118 Investment guarantee agreements ar e sometimes stipulating this kind of substitution
in matt ere of procedure, too; see, j"st"s Alm/dJ, Die Investitionsförderungsverträge der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, FrankfurtIM. 1971, 163-169; for an exarnple, cj., art, 6 of
the Gorma n-Portuguese treary of Sept. 16, 1980 (BGBl . 1982 vol. 11,57).
t1ll In particular in those instances where 00 sufficient judicial proteeden is available for
individual persons; for an older similar view, see, Münch (note 83),317-318.
1%0 On arts. 173 (1), 169, 170 and 172 of ehe EEC Treaty, see, Constantinesco {note 31),
880-889; Vl Tich Eoerling, Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften noch
Herren der Verträge?, in: Festschrift H ermann Mosler (noce 108), 173-191 (181-183). N o
obligation does exist, however, which would restriet member Stares to proc eed only via art.
170; see, Hans.Wol/ram Da;g, Art. 170, in: Von Jer G roeben et Al. (noce 35), 191-199 (192-
193): S",i/ (noee 106), 226-227.
'" CI., Wen g/" (noce 42), 1297 (- 1298), n. 2.
t!! Drawing the line between a mere restrietion and a lass of State scvereignty was
the crucial issue of a diseussion led many yeacs ago with respect tO th e strueture of the Rorne
treaties establishing two European Communities, since these conventions included no time
limits (bue see art. 97 of the ECSC Treary) and no other provisions on the tr eaties ' eventual
termination; cl., e. g" Georg Erler, Das Grundgesetz und die öffentliche Gewalt internationaler
Staatengemeinschaften, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung deutscher Staatsrechts-Lehrer
(VVdStRL) vol. 18 (1960), 7-49 (18); for a more recent view, see also, Eoerling (note 120),
183-1 84 ; Beutler (note 91), 64-66.
tn Although somewhat remore, arecent provision on international responsibility contained
in a United Nations' General Assembly resolution on "Principles Governing the Use by
assumed that any third entity which onee pronouneed its posinve attitude
towards th e new international person is at the same time waiving its right to
exereise diplomat ie protection ; the aet of reeognition does not neeessarily
imply th e total exclusion of counter-measures against any kind of eonduet
of the organization from then on. Even if it may be eonforming to inst itu tio nal
law, it ean nevertheless be aeting eontrary to rules of publie intern ationallaw,
e. g., when it claims ext raterritorial effee ts beyond the limits laid down by
the law of nat ions in this field.'" In such instanees too, it seems appropriate
not to assume any restrietions on state sove reignty whose existence and scope
are not c1early established.
d) It results therefrom that at least the member Stares of international
organizat ions are hardly ever enticled to take traditional measures of diplo-
mat ie protection against the institutional aetivities, but that third states may
be much less restricted. However, these international persons as weil under
normal eireumstanees will not be able to proteer their nationals in tho se eases
where an intergovernmental institurion did nothin g more than break a mere
contractual obligatio n in respeet of an external private person. First, such
behaviour eannot fairly be deseribed as a violation of a minimum sta ndard
of internationallaw."""" Furthermore, an entity other than the organization
Stares of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direcr Television Broadcasting" would
be a good example for this possible doubling of obligations wbich resule from unlawful con-
duct ; see, Annex DO. 9, of Resolution 37192, of Fcbruary 4, 1983. reprinted in: ILM vcl . 22
(1983), 451-454 (453).
n4 As in other insta nces, tbe organizatioa can have 00 more rights man other [Stare)
subjects of public international law. The recognition as an international personaliry means in
particular, if not exclusively, the capacity of being endowed with rights and dut ies under
public international law, corroborating first of all ehe (partial) legal existence of this person
in the international area by confront ing it with other entities of the same order; see, Müncb
(note 83), 320; Seidl-Hobenoeidern (note 72), 504.
125 Today, its universal customary law characrer may be doubtful although the standard
of national trearment has been enridied suhstantially hy domesric human rights norms not
only in "civilized narions" of the Normern hemisphere; it is thereby raised tO the level of the
traditional and well-known provisions on the rreatment of aliens; see, for an older vie w
Garcia-Amador (noee 99), 429-442, end, more recently, RicharJ B. Lillich, Duties of Stares
Regard ing the Civil Rights of Aliens, in : RdC vnl. 161 (1978 111), 329-442 (373- 408);
also Myrts S. McDougal1 HarolJ D.1Asswelll Lung-ehu Cben, Tbc Proteerion of Aliens from
Discrimination and WorId Puhlic Order: Responsibüity of States Conjoined with Human
Rights, in: AlII. vol. 70 (1976), 432-469 (440-467).
1ft Even if the proper law of the contract is public international law or, in parti cular, is
based on general principles of law (as mentioned in art. 38 [1) lit. c of the Starure of the
I. c. ]. ), then that does not always mean that abreach. of contractual obligations must be
qualified as wrongful under puhlic international law, nor mat th e non -Stare party is entitled
tO proceed under the norms on State responsibility. Such an "intemationalizarion" could
hardly take pl ace even in the relationship between States and persons of foreign municipal
law ; see, however, lutta Stoll, Vereinbarungen zwischen Staat und ausländischem Investor,
Berlin et al. 1982, 94- 136, and the critical review of this book by Wilhtlm WengIer, in:
Juristen~Zeitung (JZ) vol. 37 (1982), 654-655. Moreovec, the (non-contractual) protection
can take care of its risks by inserting a clause into its contract with that
institution stipulating the jurisdictional competence of national courts, e, g.
those of the State where the institution is Iocated, '" Within member Stares
of an organization whose immunity from jurisdietion as weil as from execution
has been granted by treaty provisions, the injured person mayaiso be capable
at least of claiming damages from its horne Stare arguing that this "interna-
t ionalization" minimized constitutionally guaranteed rights to judicial pro-
tection.''' As regularly only nationals of member states are appointed em-
ployees of international organizations, no right of third States to exercise
diplomatie protection will arise in these normal cases.Ut But since intra-
inst itu tional judicial protection is available only for aggrieved members of
the staff of an organization, if at all, it seems possible that its organs may
execute institutional law provisions in a manner that is clearly contradicting
rules of public international law. A failure like that, however, can easily be
corrected by a rescinding judgment of the organization's administrative tri-
bunal if the injured person files an appeal. The scope of judicial review seems
fairly broad'" in respecr of this kind of suit, and such a mechanism of
proteenon will make it rather obsolete for ahorne Stare to use any (other)
means of giving shelter. Within the framework of institutional legal orders,
however, only a few remedies exist relating particularly to normative acts,
because primary law provisions rarely contain more detailed prescriptions
for the specific subject matters which have to be stipulated in staff regulations
and staff rules.'" Since this fact too, can be derived from prior conduct of
of property ae the level of international law does not also encompa ss mere secondary obli-
gations based on private Iaw, see, Broumlie (noce 14), 532-533.
UT That may in particular be the case if the jurisdictional competence of a third State
can be based on internationatly recognized legal foundations such as, e. g., the nationality
of an injured person, in order to establish a genuine link for its claim ; see in general,
Frederide Alexander Mann. The Dcctrine of Jurisdietion in International Law (1964), in :
id., Srudies in International Law, Oxford 1973, 1-139 (15-41); Michael B. Akehurst, Juris-
diction in International Law, in: BYIL vol. 46 (1972/73), 145-257 (179-212).
118 In the Federal Republie of Germany, a consriturional eomplaint allowing tO drallenge
ehe eonsent of national organs (wben it was given in the fonn of astatute) is available.
Moreover, in a tor t aetion based on insufficient exerc ise of diplomatie protection, there
would normally also be a review of eonstitutional law aspects arising out of any relevant
restri crions of dom esric judicial competences (on behalf of becoming er being a member
of a certain international organiution); ci.; Georg Ren, Mangelhafte diplomatische Protektion
und Staatshaftung, in: ZaöRV vnl. 32 (1972), 420-482 (460-466).
u, Plantey {note 54), 95-96; see, also for an earlier view Georges Langrod , Observations
sur le recrutement a Ja fonction publique internationale, in: Revue H ellenique de Dro it
Intemarional vol. 13 (1960), 99-189 (128-143).
130 For a more deeailed evaluation, see, Pellet (note 55), 701-707, and 740-745; also
Plantey {note 54) , 428-431.
131 See, e. g., the rather short provisions contained in art, 24 of the (EC) "Merger Treary";
art, 101 (1) of the UN Chaner; arr. 11 (1) of the OECD Convention ; also Baade (note 114),
254; Plante] (note 54), 62-64.
member Stares, i. e. the establ ishment of an organization endowed with specific
tasks and powers, a right to protection is limited to the modes of attitudes
admissible wirhin the special membership relations. Legislative activities of
intern at ional organizations are always performed by councils consisting of
member Stare representatives, and th is main organ also bears responsibiliry for
those acts.'" Therefore this very organ would seem to be the right vehiele for
aState right to exercise diplornat ic protection. Whether Stares are bound
to use their rights at all, and if yes whether in a certain manner and d irecti on,
for the benefit of the ir nat ionals, is not an internationallaw issue, this problem
must rathe r be resolved by lookin g at provisions of mun icipallaw.
IH. IsT he r e a Sub j e c t i v e Pub I i c La w R i g h t
t o C la i m an E x e rcise o f Dipl om at i e P rotect i on
A g ai nst Inter government al Acts Under Ge rma n
( C o ns t i t u t i o n al) Law?
1. a) Already the Draft Constitut ion passed by the Paul's Churdi Assembl y
on March 28, 1849 stated in its sec. 189 that every German national abroad
will be granted shelter by the Empire.'" The wording relating to this "basic
right of the German people " seems significant insofar as an exercising of the
right to protection did not depend on previous acts of foreign Sta tes only. Th e
legislators held it to be most impo rta nt that an injury was inflicted on a
(private) person. In a similar sense, the norms of other German constitutions
- in particular art, 3 (6) of the Cons titution of the Empire (Reich) of 1871'"
and art. 112 (2) of the basic legal document of the Weimar Republic'" -
stipulate an indivi dual right to protection by (central) Stare organs without
any restrictions "against forei gn countries" ("dem Ausland gegenüber") .
In spit e of such rather broad formulae, only a sovereign Stare would in
those times have been held a proper counterpart since the early administ rative
unions?" as weH as other international institutions already existing!" were only
lU Henry G. Sdsermers, International Institutional Law, vol . I. Leyden 1972, 158; Hahn
(note 2. ). 55 and 62; Seidl-Hobenoeldern (note 25), 06-137.
tU On this provision, see, Geck (note 62), 479; Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungs-
gesdridrte seit 1789, vol. 11, Sturegare 1960, 778 .
1" A similar wording is also used in art. 3 (6) of the constitut ion of the Federarien of
No rthem Germany c f July 26, 1867; GerJe (note 62)• • 79.
l U Cf., in paniculac, Cule (noce 62), 481-507; Dothring (note 5), 31-42; C erhard
Am c:hüt z , Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reimes - Kommentar, 14th ed., Berlin 1933
(reprinted 1960), 5.1.
138 See, Wilhelm Kau fmann, Les unions internation ales de nature economique, in : RdC
vol. 3 (1924 II), 181-290 (189- 282) ; G~org Erler, Grundprobleme des Internationalen
Wiruchafuredlts, Göttingen 1956,78-80; Hahn (note 2-4), 19.
137 For a profound study of their development, see, Jac:ob Ur Meulen, Der Gedanke der
Internationalen Organisation in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung, vol. I. The Hague 1917,
loose inter-state relationsh ips, which had not been endowed with any signifi-
cant publie autho rity by their mernbers.!" It may not be surprising, therefore,
that learned authors as weil never expressed any doubts in respeet of the
neeessary eor relat ion between the status of international relations in general
and the eoneept of diplomatie proteetion, and that th ese writers deseribed
only stkh means of realizing one's rights to prot ection th at were aimed solely
at foreign States.!"
b) Nowadays neither the Basic Law nor a constirution of a member Stare
of the Federal Repub lie of Germany lay down explieit rules as the ir prede-
eessors did, or as does also art. 33 (1) of the present Constitution of the
German Democratie Republie" ', wh ich st ipul ates an "entitlement " to pro-
teenon against foreign publie authorit ies. From th e lack of debate on that
issue wirhin th e Parliamentary Coune il, no wider conelusions should be drawn
since the particular politicaI sirua tio n at the time of its discussions and
deeision-making explains th is silenee fairly weil . This atti tu de ean thus ha rd ly
be interpreted as a conscious dev iation from th e legal tradit ions or even as an
explieit negation of an individual right tOdiplomatie protection,'"~ This would
obviously not be eonforming with val id provisions of sta tu tory law eontained
in the Co nsular law whidi was enaeted in 1867 wirh in the Northern German
Federarien and ncver repealed since!" until its successor sta tute went int o
force in 1974'" providing even for a legal obligation of offieials to give adviee
and assistance to all German nationals in the special ease of eonsular pro-
tecrion, tU
vcl. n/r, The Hague 1929, vol. H/2, The Hague 19"0; also Angelo Piero Sereni, Dir irre
internazionale, vol. 11/2, Milano 1960, 796-800.
138 The exercise of sovereign rights in respect of certain territories which is performed by
intergovernmental entities direcely, seems to be of a peculiar kind only insofar as in such
instances the supreme organ of the area would be established by external state bodies; see,
Dahm {note 4), vol. I, 566-567; Wen gier (note 42), 1266-1271 , boeh authors dealing
particularly with the situation of the Saar territory betw een 1919 and 1934 and also with
the exact Inter pretation of art. 81 of the UN Charter. Only if the organ has been instituted
in a genuinely international manner, can there be any activities of the organization which da,
in fact, encroach upon aliens' rights and thereby cause measures of diplomatic protection tO
be taken.
... Cf., Gerk (nore 62), 494 ; Ha tschek (not. 8), 401.
140 The "People's Chamber" consriturion of 1949 did not yet conta in such a provision. For
an evaluarion of the "basic right tO legal protection by the Stare and its organs", see,
Walter Assmann I Karl Bönn;nger et al ., Staatsrecht der DDR - Lehrbuch, Berlin 1977,
153-154.
tU For this view, see, Geck {note 62), 509-51 0; Doebring {note 5), 43-45 and 89; and
for an earlier view Herbett K raus, Die auswä rti ge Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
nam dem Bonner Grundgesetz, Göttingen 1950, 7-9.
tU BGBI. 137, as amended by starute of August 28, 1969 (BGBL vol. I, 1513).
,.. BGBI. 1974 vol. 1, 2317 (sec. I ).
t U It seems possible to inquire about the constit uricnaliry of this legal provision which is
of a minor rank than the Basic Law itse1f; however, this appears somewhat superfluous, in
e) Moreover , the failure of th e law-makers to amend the constitution ean
easily be explained. The Germ an Federal Constitutional Court held in a
judgment in 19741<$ - al though possibly only as an obiter dictum - , that
"the right for German nat ionals onl y to claim protect ion by federal orga ns
against foreign Stares" would grow direetly from the fundamental relation-
ship of na tionality. The court did not explieitl y mention any speeifie con-
stitutional provisions,'" such as, e. g., a rt, 16 (1) of the Basic Law"', but sinee
then th e legal effeet of this rule no longer depends on its formal incorporation
into th e text of the constitutional doeument.
Other decisions of the supreme German court, however, seem to use some-
what different connota tions and may be regarded as Furth erin g signifieant
prog ress coneerni ng th e traditional eoneepts of German eonstitutional law
scholars."· This new line of thinkin g may be less important in respecc of
sta ternents like th e one holding that an obl igation of fed eral organs to exereise
protection would exist "o n behalf of th e eonstitution ""', and that a violanon
thereof eould be "deseribed as objeetively break ing eonstitutional law pro-
visions"150, because direct legal effects, i. e. more than mere exhortations or
programs, have already been derived from the words of art, 112 (2) of rhe
Weimar constitution. '!'
However, the "const itut ional underpinnings" of the obligation to exercise
dipl ornat ic prot ection.t " wh ich have been eireumseribed ever more distinetly
particular when look ing at the great number of comparable Darms in Foreign legal orders and
also at art. 5 lits. (a) and (i) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of April 24,
1963 (BGBI. 1969 vol. H, 1585).I" BV. rfGE vol. 37 (1975), 217-265 (241).
148 For th e same v iew , see also, Eckart Klein, Diplomatischer 5<:hutz und grundrechtliche
Sdtutzpflidtt , io : DöV vol. 30 (1977), 704- 710 (707); id., Schlußwort, in: DöV vol. 32
(1979), 39- 40 (40); Albrecbt R4ndelzho/er, Art. 16, in: Theodor Maunz I Günter Düng,
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 6th ed, Münmen 1982 et seq., 37 (n. 1), with funh er references.
in As did, e, g., Hans D. Tr tfJiranus, Nochmals: Diplomatischer Schutz und grundrechtliche
Schutzpflidu, in: DöV vol. 32 (1979), 35-39 (37), who cites - rather incorrecrly - Theodor
Maunz as being of the same opinion; see this author' s eommenu on An. 16 (1968), in:
Maunz I Dürig (nore 146), 3rd ed., München 1969 et seq., 8-9, and recenrl y R4ndelzho/er
{note 146), 22 and 36.
148 See, Maunz (note 147), 8, mentioning writings of Paul Laband and Karl Strupp.
'41 Ci.; r. g., BV. rfGE vol. 40 (1976), 141- 179 (177); vol. 55 (1981), 349-370 (364). In
some other decisions, however, the source of this legal obligation within the hierarchieal order
of law remains somewhat obseure; see, BVerfGE vol. 6 (1957), 290-300 (299); vcl. 41
(1976), 126-193 (182).
150 BV.rfGE vol. 40 (1976), 177.
1~1 Cf., Geck (note 62), 482-483; Doehring (note 5), 34 and 41; Anschütz (note 135),
513-518.
1~2 Probably For the 6rst time, this eonneetion was deseribed by Geck (note 62), 489; for
the same vlew, see, Klein {note 146), 707. Ingo von Münch, Art. 1, .in : id. {ed .), Grundgesetz
- Kommentar, 2nd ed., vol. I, München 1981, vol. 11. München 1983, vot. I: 65-104 (79),
referring to a decision of the Higher Administrative Tribunal at Münster. in: Deutsches Ver-
in recent years, must be regarded as one more step to a better understanding
of the concept itself although there happened hardly anything more man a
drawing of necessary conc1usions from the doctrine of modern constitutional
statehood. The German Basic Law has to be looked at, then, as source and
foundation of all public power within the (territorial and person al) limits of
its scope of application, and there is no reason at all to exempt the field of
foreign policy from the imperatives of municipal law norms.''' The Federal
Consritutional Court could also draw some more arguments from well-known
opinions concerning the review of treaty powers,U4 in particular when
elaborating differences whidr result from the Factual divergences between
border-crossing activities and the use of those state powers whidi derive from
territorial, as opposed to personal, sovereignty only.15' A linkage berween
both forms of conduct in international relations is created when conc1uding
treaties or other international agreernents as ODe rneans of exercising diplo-
matie prorection .v"
Although efficient help may only be available by acting on the level of,
and in conformity with public international law, making often necessary
"acts of government" for implernentation, it does not follow from this fact
that judicial review cannot be permitted at all: Given that each State act may
waltun gsblatr (DVBI.) vol. 77 (1962), 139-141 (140): Randelzboier (ooee 146), 37. - S..
also - but without an expl icaticn of his own poinr of view - Dieter Blwmenunt z, Die
deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit und die Sdluupflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in:
Andreas Hd Jrich I Din er Bennch I Hans-lüTgen Sonnenbergn' (eds.), Konflikt und Ordnung,
Festschrif t Morad Ferid, München 1978, 439-449 (446-447).
153 Albert B/eckmann, Grundgesetz und v ölkerredit, Berlin 1975, 241, ce(ers ( 0 some dicta
in BVerfGE vol. .. (1956), 157-178 (162); see also Günur Düng, Art. 1 IlI, in: Maunz /
Dürig (note 146), 55; Klaus Stern , Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I
and 1I, München 1977-1980, vol. 11: 555 ; Von Münch (noee 152), 79. For more detailed
elaborations of the issue whether there exist constitutional law norms relaring to proteenon
for bord er-crossing (private) activities as weIl as for other ways of behaviour of nationals
abroad, see, in particular, Karl Matthias Mttssen, Staatsverträge zum Internationalen Privat-
recht, in : BerGesVR vol. 16 (1975), 49-95 (62-67): Albert Bleckmann I Bartold Busse, Die
Ausreisefreiheit der Deutschen, in: DVBI. vol. 92 (1977), 794-798; Cb ristian Tomuschat, Der
verfassungsseaar im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen, in: VVdStRL vol. 36 (1978),
7-63 (19-21, and 42-49) ; Brun-Ctto Bryae, Internationale Verhaltensregeln für Private ,
FrankfurtlM. 1981,43-45 ; Meinhara SchrödeT, Zur Wirkkraft der Grundredtee bei Sadrver-
halten mit grenzüberschreitenden Elementen, in: Festschrift Hans-j ürgm SchlochaHer (oore 37),
137-150 (138 and 141). .
154 A. had been beld in an early decision (BVerfGE vol. 1 [1952J, 396-415 [410J) and
confirmed by a Iarer one (BVerfGE vol. 4 [1956] , 162-163); see also for a more recent esse,
BVerfGE vol. 59 (1982), 63-95 (89), and Stern (note 153), vol. I: 373-374.
155 The "approximation doctrine" is described by Bleckmann (noce 153), 242-244.
158 See, BVerfGE vol. 6 (1957), 299; cf. also, Peter Sympher I Wilhelm KarlGeck, Note,
in: ZaöRV vol. 18 (1957/58), 128-136 (135-136); Franz-Christoph Zeitler, Verfassungs-
geeicht und völkerrechtlicher Vertrag, Berlin 1974, 31-32; BIHmmwitz (note 152), 447 n, 28 ;
Georg Ress, Wed:tselwirkungen zwischen Völkerredn und Verfassung bei der Auslegung
völkerrednlidrer Verträge, in : BerG",VR vol. 23 (1982), 7-59 (45).
be of a political nature insofar as its motives are inte rwoven with political
considerations,'" one can hard ly argue for a total exclusion of control by
judicial organs merel y by insist ing that "political" issues are involved. A
better solution seems to be Iying in restricting the scope of judicial rev iew in
the case of govemmenral acts of supreme Stare organs since th at limitation is
based on the fundame ntal idea of the balance of powers or functions between
the different branches of Stare organization.'''
d) The general commirmenr of Stare organs handling foreign affairs to
abide by the prescriptions of the Basic Law and, in particular, by its human
rights norms has on the other hand been modified by p rovisions of the same
consti tutional rank. Th ese are often looked at as containing a fun damental
decision for an "open sta tehood" ("offene Staatlichkeit") of the Federal
Republic of Germany,'" or at least for an attitu de favouring the recognition
and implernentation of international law ru les wi rhin the domestic legal
order.!" Primarily in respect of an inst irurionalized international co-operation,
the makers of the consti tution created a kind of "lever for integration
purposes" wh ich allows the functions of supranatio nal public powers to become
effective within the municipal legal order by authorizing non-st äte foreign
normative prescriptions in a manner which is corroborated by constitutional
enactment, tft
Assuming that such a de-concenrration of pu bl ic powers formerly attributed
to nation Stares - and its realization in international practice - is permitted,
th is Fact does not necessarily imply any significant deterioration of the
external effecrs of constitutionally guaranreed rights , Already in the cou rse
of establishing international organizations, insti tutional norms of the nego-
tiating parties and (probably) founding members have normally been taken
into account insofar as a full legal validity under pu blic internatio nal law will
not come into effeer before ratification procedures under municipal legal
orders have taken place.'" Within the framework of a valid organizational
1li7 See, Wolf-RiiJigrr Schenkt, An. 19 Abs. " {Zweirbearbeitung 1982), in : Bonner
Kommentar (note 25), 125.
158 Ci., Ress (note 128),452-454 ; Schmke (eore 157), 126; Giinttr Diirig, Art. 19 IV, in:
Maunz I Diirig (note 146), 13-15.
U I Klaus Vogd, D ie Verfassungsentscheidung des Grundgesetzes für eine offen e Staatlich-
keit, Tübingen 196-4, passim; see also. Bltcltmann (note 153). 2..0-2..1; Ondolf Rojahn,
Art. 24, in: Von Mönch (note 152) vol. 11: 99-133 (100-10t).
110 er. the Preamble , ans . 1 (2), 9 (2), 24, 25. and 26 of the Basic Law ; on the systemarical
contex r, see, Stern (noee 153). vol. I : 351-352; Bledemann (note 153), 298-302; R ess
(nore 156), 37.
111 For funher details, see, Gramüch (note 107), 157-159; but also Tomusdrat (note 25).
20 and 25-26; Stern {note 153), vol. I: 387-388.
It! First of all, in a lot of cases the original agreements are requiring formal ratifications
by (all) member Sta tes ; see, e. g., arr. 110 (1) of the UN Charter; arr. 247 (1) of the EEC
dia rt er, th ere wou ld also be hardly any absolute prohibit ion by virtue of
institut ional law provisions, to take app ropriate regard of the situation
or the legal orders of member Stares. The main organ of all those intergovern-
mental ent ities is even bound to take care that the pa rt icular interests of each
country are respeeted, and the refore at least one representative of every
participating country has a voting right within the organization 's council. '"
Because this orga n is at th e same time obl iged to ding to common, i. e. com-
rnunity aims and objectvies, in order ro ensure the performance of its task s,lU
the linking of member Stares' representatives to impera tives of th eir domestic
law will often coincide with vital interests of an international institution,
even if this ambivalent attitude may be somewhat cumbersome du ring the
processes of debating and decision-making.v" The sole Fact of having to follow
( W O rnasters is not considered an ahuse of the personality of an inst itution
nor as illic it interfercnce int o that institurion's ow n affairs.ll U' Wh ether a State
representative insisting on the maintenance of domest ic civil liberti es will be
successful at an international institu tional level, may depend less on th e persu-
asiveness of th e juridical arguments drawn upon by hirn, th an on the speci/ic
chara cterisrics of the organizational st ructure : The Germ an member casrin g
his vote in confonn ity with consritutio nal mandates or even imperatives, for
instance, would only be able to get th e desired effeets in respect of th e
contents of decisions taken by an instit utional org an if th e organization 's
diarte r would provide for unanimity,'" or if ir stipulated at least that non-
Treaty; an . 14 (1) of the OECD Convencion. Furthermo re, many munici pa l law provisions
stipulate the pr econdition of prior pac1iamentary approv al; see for instance, an. 59 (2) cl. 1 of
ehe German Basic Law, as inte rpreted by Theodor Maunz, Art. 59, in: Maunz I Dürig {no te
146), 9-10, and also the comments on art. 24 by ehe same author, in: op. cis., 10; cl . Ondoll
Rojahn, Art. 59, in : V on Münd> (note 152), vol. 11: 789-824 (801) ; Gramlid> (not. 107),
153; see, moreover, art. 53 (1) of the Frendi Constitution of 1958, and ar r. 93 of the Spanish
Fundamental Law of 1978.
183 See already, 5UpT4, notes 58 tO 60, and also Ignaz Seidl-Hobenveldem , Der Rückgriff
auf die Mitgliedstaaten in Internationalen Organisationen, in: Festsehrift Hermann ModeT
(ao te 108), 881-890 (885).
164 Ci, e, g., ar ts. 4 (1) and 2 of tbe EEC Treat y, and the comments thereto by Ipsen
(note 31), 345-346; Comtantinesco (note 31). 410-411; Bleckmann (noee 29), 21.
I" For this view, see also, Wmgler (noee 42), 1292- 1293; Hahn (nore 24), 69-70;
Roland Bieber, Institutionelles System, in: Beutler et 41. (note 91), 98-152 (120-121).
1M The prorecrion of member Stares' interests can be guaranteed by way of esta blishing
procedures allowing national parliamentary debat es on proposed Communities' activities in
fields whidt are vital from the perspecd ve of national sovereignty. This possibiliry is
provided for in art. 2 of the German etatut e authorizing the ratification of the Rome
t reaties, BGBI. 1957 vol. 11, 753.
117 For an evaluation of new procedures of decision-mak ing, see, Ha ns Bal/ Teich, Wesen
und Wirkung des "Konsens " im Völkerrecht, in: Festschrift H ermann Mo d er {note 108), 1-24
(6- 12); but also the cri tical remarks on such an extensicn of the tradi tional sources of publ ic
international law by Prosper Weil , Towards Relative Normativity in Internat ional law?
in: All!. vol. 77 (1983), 413-442 (434- 438).
vocing members shall be treated as not bound.'" Moreover, if intergovernmen-
tal acts have at last become legally valid, objections based on municipal con-
stitutional guarant ees can only be raised by claiming that modifications should
be debated within the organ consisting of Stare representatives, at least in those
instances - law-making, for example - which belong tO its genuine compe-
tence.'" An initiative of that kind , howe ver, will hardly reach its aim. There
often no longer exists any (preventive) Stare right wich respect to exercis ing
diplomatic protection against (impending) activities (presumably) not in con-
formity wich publ ic international law, at least insofar as the civil liberties
guaranteed under the Basic Law grant stronger individual rights than does
the international minimum standard, and therefore an infringement of public
international law rules seems to be improbable.v? But if an entitlement is
missing, a constitutional obligation also cannot be assumed.
2. a) The Fact that the organs of th e Fede ral Republic of Germany are
bound to exercise diplomatic protection in the aforementioned manner does
not mean that each citizen may claim an individual subjective righ t "to
diplomatie protection" of his own.!" In particular, such a claim cannot be
derived from any norms of the Basic Law.'" On the other hand, the tradi-
tional formula of a "claim" to protection in I aga inst foreign States rather
suppo ses looking at th e effect iveness of specific constitutionally based
guarantees from other points of view than those of the classical aspect alone
which has often been described as "status negativus ".'" If the Basic Law more
than once commands certain State activi ties to be undertaken , as is expressly
stated in several provision s of the Bonn constirution,"! if Stare organs are
rea As in ehe case of ar r. 6 (2) of th e OECD Convention, cf ., Huga j. Hahn I Albrecht
Weber, Die OECD-Organisation für Winsmaftlidte Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Bad en-
Baden 1976, 95-98.
1111 Hahn (note 24), 78-82; Seidl-Hohenve/dern (note 25), 231.
170 Per a more detailed discussion, see, B/eckmann (note 153), 342 and 354-366; c], also,
Ondol! Rojahn, Art . 25, in : Von Mönch {ncte 152), vol. 11: 135-166 (154).
171 Treoiranss (note 147), 37; see also, Stern (note 153), vol. I: 362 and 365; Rsndehboier
(note 146), 38.
17! Treviranus' attack on Klein may be erroneous, see the contrary positions as stated in:
DöV vol. 32 (1979), 37 and 40. Cf. also, Bledemann I Bosse (note 153), 796; Bleckmann
(nore 153),245-246: Geck (note 62), 517; R... (note 128),451: Stern (note 153), , vol. I :
209: Von Mönch (note 152), 79 and 81-82.
173 On several thecries and interpretarions in respect of fundamental rights, ci., Ernst-
Walfgang Bödtmförde, Grundrednstheoeie und Grundrechtsinterpretaricn, in : Neue Juristische
Wod!e",chr;ft (NJW) vc l, 27 (1974), 1529-1538 ; Stern {ncte 153), vol. I : 728-732: Kon rad
Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 14th ed. Karisruhe
1984,111-122; ErbarJ Dtnning~T, Staatsrecht, vol. 2, Reinbek 1979, 181-193.
17' I. e., arts 1 (1) cl. 2, 6 (1) and (4); also art, 5 (2). Tbe first provision contains a legal
obligation for each Stare organ to take defensive measures against any attacks on irs own
nationals by foreign Stare entities; see, Hans Carl Nipperdey, Die Würde des Menschen, in :
obliged to plaee themselves "at the assistanee and furtherance" of the human
personality as listed explieitly in the eivil liberties' eatalogue,176 then the ju-
risprudenee of the Federal Constitutional Court on diplomatie protection
(against unlawful foreign attacks) may be deser ibed as an integra l element of
a value-based concep tion' :" of human rights, and it seems neeessary to eonsent
to the existenee of an individual subjeet ive right to claim an exereise of
diplomatie protection, at least in principle.!" Such a eonclus ion would also be
perfeetly in line with the Basic Law's very positive attitude to wards publie
international law in general: The rnak ers of the constirution thereby declared
their willingness to aeeept the rules of the game in international relations,
thc only impl ieit reservation being that there is also a duty to fight against
unlawful eonduet of other aetors on that level with all mean s legally avail-
able.!" Granting a subjective right to protection aga inst any foreign publie
authority would at least be a more persuasive way to make sure that foreign
aHairs are always conducted by offieials mindful of the constitutional law
lirnits on their behaviour.!"
b) Insofar as genera l public international law as weil as - by way of
art , 25 of the Basic Law - '" the Germ an domestie legal order are permitting
an exercising of diplornatic protection against acts of inrergovernmental
organs and do not allow only less important means of taking influenee, an
individual subjective right to protection has to take account of the "Iimirs of
Karl August Bettetmann I Franz Neum4nn I Hans ea rl Nipperdey I Ulridr Scheuner (eds.),
Die Grundrechte, vnl. 11, Berlin 1954, 1-50 (26) : Geck {nore 62), 515-516: ReinholJ
Zippelius, Art. 1 (Zweitbearbeirung), in: Banner Kommentar (note 25), 21-22; Von Münch
(nore 152), 78-79.
176 Cf., BVerfGE vol. 35 (1974), 79-177 (114) : vol. 39 (1975), 1-95 (41-42): Klein
(note 146), 705-706: Bryde (nore 153), 44.
178 Bur see also some critical comments on this approach. by Böckenförde (note 173), 1533-
1534 : Denninger (note 173), 150-152 and 182-183j foe a different approach, see, Randelz -
hofer (note 146), 38.
117 See, Geck {note 62), 518; also Hu go ]. Habn , Staatsvertraglicher Verzicht auf Ver-
mögensredne und verfassungsredrrl idier Eigenrumsschutz, in: Manfred Abelein I ou« Kimminich
(eds.), Studien zum Staats- und Völkerrecht, Festschrift Hermann &schhofer, Kallmünz 1977,
59- 76 (60-63); BryJe (note 153), 43: and - Je.. distinetly - Blememoit z (note 152), 447.
The contrary position is held , e.g., by Ren (note 128),450-451; TTnJiranus (note 147), 37;
Von Miinoo {nore 152), 79: & nJelzhofer (note 146), 38-39.
It may be wort h noting here that the Draft Constitution worked OUt by the "Pa ulskirdre-
assembly" more man a century ago, already contained a provision providing For legal
remedies in similar instances, i, e., sec. 126 lit, (g); ci.; Huber {note 133), 835.
17. Cf., Rojahn (noee 170), 137: Stern (note 153), vol. 1: 358-359.
17' For a lucid expl an arion, see, Hans-Julius Wolff lOtto Bachof, Verwaltungsrechr, vol. I,
9th ed. München 1974, 328-329; Schenke {note 157), 126; Carl Hermann Uie, Effektiver
Rechtsschutz in einer funktionsfähigen Redn,pflegel, in : DVBI. vol. 97 (1982), 821-831 (822).
180 Cf., Rojahn (noee 170), 149; TrnJiranus {note 147), 36; Stern (not e 153), vol. I: 362.
the effectiveness of States".'81 It can hardly be surprising then, that courts'"
as weil as learned authors'" agree that the cornpetent organs, i. e. the Federal
Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular.v" dispose of
broad discretionary powers as to whether and to what extent they may exercise
diplomatic protection,
With reference to the conduct directed at foreign Stares only, this statement
cannot be drawn into doubt since here the limited diances for enforcement
action will be the crucial point. As to international organizations, there is
hardly a justification for any different result norwithstanding some factual
divergences between both types of persons of public international law.''' In
this case tOD, the Basic Law grants a very wide scope of discretion to the
organs engaged in the management of foreign affairs, in relation both to
prognosticating the relevant events wirhin the international field and to
deciding on the viability of various possibilities of conduct.'''
c) In exercising its political discretion, the Federal Government is, however,
not altogether free or bound to abide only by a few fundamental rules like
the prohibition to discriminate as laid down in art. 3 (1) of the Basic Law.'87
True, a direct infringement upon human rights legally effective by virtue of
German law can never occur as a result of actions by foreign public authorities
since the Basic Law is binding only on German official acts including those
performed abroad.'" Non-German public authorities, however, have to respeet
only the norms of their own legal order, any international law limits left
aside for the moment. If organs of the Federal Republic of Germany are
participating not merely passively in acts of foreign public powers,18' they are
181 Wilhelm von Humboldt wrcte in 1792 about "Ideen zu einem Viersuch, Die Gränzen
der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen". 'Ihis book, bowever, - published for the first
time in 1851 - deals with a rather different topic, namely an inquiry intc the nature of
tasks which can be implemented solely by public authorities.
18% See for a recent case, BVerfGE vcl . 55 (1981), 349-370 (364-368) ; Official Reports
of the Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE) vol. 62 (1982), 11-18
(15-18).
183 The first to express this view probably was Geck (note 62), 517-518; see also, Bryde
(note 153), 43-44 and 46; Schenke (note 157), 126 and 127; Randelzhofer (note 146), 38-39.
184. Rojahn (note 162), 793-794; Maunz (note 162), 4-5.
185 The relevant circumstances are the same in both cases; for the same vlew , see, Bryde
(note 153), 46-47.
'86 BVerfGE vol. 55 (1981), 365.
187 For this narrow view, see, howevee, Trev;ranus (note 147), 37; Schenke (noce 157), 127;
and probably also Albert Bleckmann, Gesetzesvorbehalt für Nadirüstungf, in: DVBI. vol. 99
(1984), 6-14 (10 and 14).
188 Bledemann (ncte 153), 241; Von Münch (note 152), 78-79; see also, BVerfGE vol. 57
(1982),9-28 (23); vol. 58 (1982), 1-45 (26-27).
18t Some authors (see, e. g., Treuiranus [note 147], 38: and also BVerfGE vol. 40 [1976],
166) hold that merely not rejecring public acts of foreign Stares does not necessarily mean
supporting the purposes and ehe aims of those measures. But these arguments seem to be in
under an obligation to behave in confonnity with the imperatives of their
national (constitutional) law.
aal Each time the competent organs are deliberating, either as a result of
petitions by an individual or of their own accord in the performance of their
official functions, rao whether they should - or even must - exercise a right
to diplomatic protection under public international law and if yes, which is
a viable means of protection, these organs are contemplating possible re-actions
of German authorities which are prescribed by the Basic Law and are therefore
allowed only insofar as they do not deviate from its imperative norms.'" One
way of exercising protection will often be the negotiating of a treaty (if
possible);'" thereby non-German acts of State are either accepted by German
authorities, or at least similar measures to recognize them must be implemented.
These kinds of activiries by ahorne Stare have also to be in conformity with
the national (German) legal order.'"
bb) In respect of intergovernmental organizations of which the Federal
Republic is a member, the municipal law aspect of its participation there
seems to be another criterion, especially when looked at from a constitutional
point of view."· After entry into the international entity has become valid
under domestic constitutional law - or when it can at least no longer be
centrast with other statements of the same learned authors, that there is a right to prorection.
It can hardly be denied thar there have to be some deliberations on the issue whether to
exercise diplomatie prctection, before a Stare organ possibly decides to remain inaccive. Then,
th ere seem tO be 00 sound reasons why these early phases in the deci sion-making process
should be excluded from judicial review; cf ., 'Habn (note 177), 60-61 ; Bryde (note 153), 45.
1110 This is because it Is the international person itself which has been injured in irs
sovereign rights; see, Dahm (note 4), vol. III : 258-259; Randelzhofer (note 146), 22.
1111 This legal obligation extends to competences, forms and procedures in respect of the
various phases of decision-making by State organs, as weil as ro the substance of govern-
mental behaviour in general ; for a similar view , see, Hahn (note 177), 62 and 72.
1112 See also, supra, notes 154 and 156.
las The issues discussed before (ae noee 192) are of importance in this context, too; see,
Bryde (note 153), 45-46.
1114. A mere treaty obligarion cannot per se restriet or even entirely StOP the claim of a
superior legal rank of municipal law provisions with respect to the territories of eadr
contracting party. The same applies to the internal, secondary law of international organi-
zations sinee these rules receive legal effect(s) only by vinue of prior authorizarion for the
main institutional organs tO legislate which is embodied in the treaty establishing the organi-
zarion; see, Tomuschat (ncte 25), 57j Meng (note 24), 71. Divergences berween public inter-
national law and municipal law may often originate in situations where the Stare repre -
sentatives convening within the main organ are acting permanently in contradiction to some
norms belonging tO the primary institutional law. Such a behaviour could be interpreted as a
stage in the developmem of a new rule of interaal customary law, or as a modification of
the original agreement; see, Seidl-Hobenueldem (note 163), 886-887; also Verdross I Simma
(note 15), 259-260 and 401. For many norms generared in this way, the prescriprions of the
dcmesric law of member Stateson the approval of rreaties will, however, hardly have been
fulfilled.
attacked by way of individual suits'" -, the constitution of every member
Stare is modified'" in relation both to scope and to content by more detailed
norms of an institutional law character.!" More generally, however, there
might result from th is lawful alterarion a change in respect of the individual
right to protection abroad as weil. The rules of the Basic Law on the relation-
ship berween internal and external norms in particular are restricting the
available means of exercising protection so far as to allow only those remedies
which are created by institutionallaw, even in such cases where a petition for
rectification is not (totally) successful.!" By establishing an administrative
tribunal within the legal Framewerk of an organization the rules of which are
conforming with minimum standards of due process as stipulated by the Basic
Law'" - nowadays this may be said of (the practice of) every administrative
tribunal of an intergovernmental character200 , the member Stares once and for
1115 In the Federal Republic of Germany, constitutional complaints by individual persons
can only be successful when taken within ODe year of the enactment of the incorporating
stature, sec. 93 (2) of the Act on the Federal Constiturional Court . Moreover, the parties of
an ordinary Iitigarion can neither force nor prevent (by agreeing on a certain legal point)
the court concemed (0 bring the case before ehe Federal Constitutional Court, sec. 80 (3) of
the aforementioned Act . See, Gerhard U!samer, § 80, in: Tbeodor Maunz I Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu et al., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz-Kommentar, München 1964 et seq., 180.
196 Same European constitu tion s (of recent origin) aurhorize the transfer of State functions
or competences onto non-stäte entities only by way of a special kind of (constitutional) law ,
or even require an expl icit alteration of the text of their constitutions; for examples of the
first of these possibilities, see, the Dan ish (sec. 20), Durch (arts. 63, 67), Norwegian (sec. 93
[1]) and Greek (arr. 28) constitutions; for ehe second one, see, Christoph Sdneuer, Beschlüsse
internationaler Organe im österreichischen Staatsrecht, in: ZaöRV vol. 37 (1977), 468-503
(472).
1117 Cf. - for the European Communities -, Tomuschat (note 25), 56-67; also Christoph
Sdrrewer, Der neue Art. 9 Abs. 2 der österreidrischen Bundesverfassung: Ubertragun g von
Hohe itsrechten auf internationale und ausländische Organe. in: ZaöRV vol. 42 (1982), 93-99
(96); Albrecht Weber, Die spanische Verfassung von 1978, in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen
Rechts vol. 29 (1980), 209-252 (234-235) ; Arghylos A. Petoxros, International Law in the
New Greek Constirution, in : AJIL vol. 70 (1976), 492-506 (498-500).
I" Ci. ; Tomuschat (note 25), 69; Rojahn (note 159), 126; Aubin (noce 42), 267-269.
11111 As the Pederal Constitutional Court held in the second "Eurocontrol" case, BVerfGE
vol. 59 (1982). 91-93 ; see also ehe concurring notes by Gramlich (note 39). 408, and by
[ost-Dietridr Busch, in: DVBI. vol. 97 (1982), 579-580; Christoph Sdneeer, Eurocontrol :
Wedlselwirkungen staatlicher und internationaler Jurisdiktion. in: Rechtswissenschaftliche
Fakultät der Universität Salzburg (ed .}, Aus österreichs Rechtsleben in Geschichte und Gegen-
wart, Festschrift Ernst C. Hellbling, Berlin 1981, 371-382 (380-382).
200 It does not matter that there is often (see, however, Pellet [note 55]. 768-782) no legal
possibiliry of appealing against a tribunal decision, since even art. 19 (4) of rhe German Basic
Law guarantees anly one judicial review; 'See, BVerfGE vcl. 54 (1981). 143-148 (148);
Schenke (note 157), 48-49; SigUTd Hendridn, An. 19, in : Von Münrh (note 152), vol. I :
687-720 (714) ; and BVerfG, in: N]W vol. 37 (1983), 2929-2931 (2929).
Ir seerns tOO early to discuss here whether this will also be true in respect of the structure
of international judicial ccnrrcl soon tO be established by dr. XI (arts. 186-191) and annex
VI of the Law of the Sea Convention of .1.982; see, supra, notes 69 and 77; also Jean-
Pierre Queneudec, Les tendances dominantes du systeme juridique issu de la convention, in:
all accept its (claim of) cornpetence in relation to the field of jurisdiction
transferred without any reservation. Thereby, they have renounced any other
possible means of act ion as after a judicial decision , a conduct which is not
permitted under public international law has either to be reversed and
corrected wirhin the institutional legal order, or rhe sta te participants can no
Ionger claim the internationa l wrongfulness of a certain activity because that
assumption is contrary to th e members' own previous conduct and would be
venire contra factum proprium.'" H, however, the judicial organ of an insti-
tution would at any t ime dismiss an appeal for lack of competence"" arguing
that there had been no activity imputable to the organization, then it would
often follow therefrom that the aggr ieved party is entitled to file a suit in
national courts against a defendant beyond the entity which was formerly
concerned with that cause, and this person would normally be wi thout the
status of immunity from municipal jurisdiction.'" In these cases local remedies
must be exhau sted unsuccessfully pri or to claimin g diplomatic proteetion
(which would be addressed to the [orum state),
However, first the question may be raised wheth er it is real ly necessary to
exercise diplomatic p rotection at all, because internal institutional law tOO
will often strengthen the individual position of the injured person: The
competent federal organs are bound both by organizat iona l and by const itu -
tional law norms' " when they are using their discret ional powers tu take
Sociche Francalse pout le Droit International (ed.) , Perspeedses du droit de la mer apres
l'issue de la 3ieme Conference des Nations Unies, Colloque de Rouen 1983, Paris 1984. 125-
173 ; Claude-Alberl Colliard, Problemes er solutions en matiere de reglement des differends,
im op. cit., 174-189: Bembardt (note 69), 974-978 and 980 : Jaenicke (note 77), 820-821
and 824.
%0 1 Cf., Verdross I Simma (noee 15), 61-62; R. Tbode, Die Quellen des Völkerrechts, in:
Menul ! Ipsen (note 26), 75-96 (89 and 92).
202 On exceptional situations such as that, see, Plantey (note 54), -428; Seyersted (note 44),
443-447.
203 Since, to give only ODe example, ehe provisions of the Eurocontrol Treaty on j uris-
diction Relating to the Settlement of Disputes in Staff Matters are anything but very clear
(see SrhT~u~T [nc te 199], 382), the rather arnbiguous wording of no. 5 of ehe Protocol of
Signarare relating to the International Convention of Dec. 13, 1960 (BGBl. 1962 vol. II,
2274) has lead at least one COUrt in a member Stau to assume national jurisdiction in
respect tO staff issues; cf., for an English digest of the decision of the Durch district court at
Sittard, in: Neth.YB.ln t. L. vcl . 9 (1978), 276-278 (277-278). A somewhat ccmparable
Iack of precise Formularions may be found in art. IV (1) lit. (d) of the Annex to the
Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agencv, of May 30, 1975 (BGBl. 1976
vol. 11, 1882). On concurrent national and intergovemmental juri sdictions, see generally,
Cbristopb Schreuer, Die Behandlung internationaler Organakte durch staatliche Gerichte,
Beelin 1977, 315-338.
204 A consritut ional law obligation would result from the friendly attitude oE the German
Basic Law in respect of public international law in general. 10e Federal Constirurional Court
held already in 1955 that -each agreement has eo be inte rp reted in such a way as to enable
the conrracting parties tO reach their common aims in the best mariner", BVerfGE vol. 4
(1956), 168: see also, Bleckmann (note 153), 244.
regard also of the consequences of their decisions in respect of the well-
functioning and ef/iciency of the organization taken as a whole,'" as weIl as
relating to its several (main) organs. Insofar, however, a member State can
only take effective (counter) measures within the institutional framework, if
it is not willing to withdraw from the organization.'" Therefore a certain
restraint upon discretionary powers seems to be normal wirhin the law of
international organizations.!" and a legal obl igation to behave only in a
predetermined manner,''' i. e, to use only those rernedies whidi are provided
for by institutional law, may he considered and indeed be areal possibility
at least in exceptional situations.t'"
cc) FinaIly, the fact that an accession to international organizations is dealt
with by norms of municipal law in the same way as an approval of simple
treaty statutes, mayaiso be a forceful argument for drawing narrow limits
on discretionary powers in the case of exercising diplomatie protection against
intergovernmental acts. Each statute aiming at the incorporation of inter-
national treaty law into the domestic legal order can be reviewed in all of its
parts whether it is containing unconstitutional elements, and redress may be
sought last not least hy way of /iling a constitutional complaint.'" A prior
consent to ordinary and lawful activities of an organization, however, cannot
restriet municipal human rights provisions any more than similar limitations
are admitted in relation to the powers of the constitutional authorities of the
German State.'" If therefore the international institutional linkages of the
%05 This particular criterion seems to have served Ipsen in construing the superioriry of
(European) Community law in relation (0 any municipal law norms of member Stares: see,
id. (nore 31), 277-278. Ci. •Iso, Ro;ahn {note 159), 123-124, but see, Stern (note 153),
vol. I: 403. The Federal Constitutional Court may at last have approved of this argument
in its "Eurocontrol- decisions, see, BVerfGE vol. 58 (1982), 41; vol. 59 (1982), 94.
•" Ci .; Ress (note 156), 41 n. 162; Beutler (noce 91), 65-66. .
201 On the domestic law origins of this concepr, see in particular, Wolf! I Bachof (nore 179),
203 and 328; Ferdinand O. Kopp, VwGO - Verwaltungsgeridrtsordnung mit Erläuterungen,
5th ed. München 1981, 809 and 823; Konrad Redeker I Hans-]oachim 'Von Oertzen , Verwal-
rungsgerichtsordnung - Kommentar, 6th ed. Stuttgart et al. 1978, 535.
208 A distinction relating to the degree of restrictions seems arguable especially in the field
of foreign affairs, when looking at the great variery of available means of lawful conduct .
Therefore, a diminution of ehe number of possible remedies does not necessarily lead to a
reduction to only one possible legal behaviour.
200 See also, a decision of ehe Federal Constitutional Court, in: BVerfGE vol. 55 (1981),
365 and 366.
210 See, supra, notes 155 and 156.
211 Insofar at least, the majoriry opinion in the "Solange- case (BVerfGE vol. 37 [1975]
271-291 [279]) seems to be conclusive, and was - in respect of the correct meaning of
art. 19 (4) of the Basic Law - confirmed later by both "Eurocontrol" decisions, BVerfGE
vol. 58 (1982), 40-43, wirh a note by Ludwig Gram/ich, in : ]Z vol . 37 (1982), 149-150
(150); BVerfGE vol. 59 (1982), 80. Cf. also, Torsten Stein, Der Beschluß des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts vom 23. Juni 1981 zu Fragen des Rechtsschutzes gegen Handlungen zwischen -
Federal Republie of Germany are taken to be in conformity with the Basic
Law in general ,'" as weil as in each individual ease - and there is no reason
for denying this - "', then the normative seope of the human rights as laid down
in ans. 1 to 19 will certainly be eapable of effeeting a modification of the
leading doetrinet14 which grants to the indi vidual person looking for proteetion
only a mere right to asound use of discrerion. The eirele of potential elaimants
for diplomatic protection may be determinable in a suffieiently exaet manner
only by analysing the legal effeets of human and eivil rights where their field
of application passes beyond national borders.... Political diseretionary powers
are thereby given more preeise Features as weil as a substantial eontent which
is a neeessary pre-eondition for a meaningful • right directed at asound use of
discretion" .211
d) First of all in their relationship to international organizations, member
Stares should be prepared - as there does not seem to be much difficulry in doing
so - to prevent on organizational conduct which is not in eonformity with
publie ineernational law. Ir may even be said that th is would be the most im-
portant ease of antieipatory diplomatie protection di reeted at imminent
aetivities.'" It should be remembered, however, that German representatives
in the main organ of an international institution are bound by stronger
legal guarantees if and insofar as there exists an obligation to act or
to abstain herefrom also on behalf of national (consritutional) law as is
st• • rlidter Einrichtungen (EUROCONTROL.Besd>luß), in : Z.öRV vol. 42 (1982), 596-601
(599- 601); Ress (note 156), 29 n. 104; but see, Roj.hn (note 159), 117-119.
zn On the requirement of taking account of the degree of international integration which
has been reached at a given moment, see, Gramlich (noee 107), 170; also TomNschat (note 25),
38-39, dealing with functional limits of ehe authorizarion contaieed in art. 24 (1) of the
Basic Law. These limits have been discussed more recently in respect of the German member-
ship wirhin the North Atlantic Treary Organization, particularly in the context of the
on- gcing deployment of new nuelear weapoas on th e territory of the Federal Republic of
Gennany; ci., e. g., W olfgang Däubler, Star ioniereng und Grundgesetz, Reinbek 1982, 114-
121 ; C hristian SaUer, Die Verfassungswidrigkeit der Raketenstati on ierun g, in : Frankfurter
Rundschau no. 266 of Nov. 15, 1983, 9. The Federal Constitutional Court did not consider
this legal issue wieh any greater precision when ir denied a mction for a temporary order on
Dec. 16, 1983, see, EuGRZ vol. 11 (1984),39- 46 (45).
... Cf., e. g., Stern (note 153), vol. I : 384 and 390-391 ; Roj.hn (nore 159), 119.
! U See particularly, Doehring (note 5), 89-94; Ren (noce 128), 454-458 ; V on Miinch
(note 149), 79; R.ndelzhofer (note 146), 38.
! I$ Klein {note 146), is referring to adecision of the Federal Administrative Court, see,
BVerwGE vol. 39 (1973), 235-239 (237), with a ncte by Ebtrhdtd Morner, in : NJW vol. 26
(1973), 1207-1208 (1208). See also, Wol f! I B.chof (note 179), 202; Schröder (note 153),
144-146.
!lt Cf. a more recent decision of the Federal Administrative Court, in: DVBI. vol. 97
(1982), 1096-1097 (1097); and also A lbert 'Von Mutius, Grundrechtsschutz contra Verfahren s-
effizienz im Verwalmngsverfahrenj, in: NJW vol. 36 (1982), 2150-2160 (2156).
1 17 See supra, nctes 58 to 61.
regularly the ease with respeet to provisions of the Basic Law.'" But only if
there is an impending danger of an international wrong to be submitred in the
near future, is a State entitled to exereise specifie acts of diplomatie protecrion.
On the other hand, those kinds of member Stare conduct which belong to the
rwilight area of international and eonstitutional law obligations and which
do not interfere with rhe legal order of an international organization, i. e.
its "internal affairs",'" are allowed under the law of nations, and they may
sometimes even be pre seribed by Basic Law norms. In th is respeet art, 27 of
the ICSID Con vention pronounces only a more general rule, at least for the
sphere of international relations.'''
3. Here, some few remarks on the procedural aspeets of the right to
protection abroad seem to be appropriate,
a) In the first place, nowadays there can hardly be any doubt that a
petition for an exercise of diplomatic proteetion must eventually be brought
before a general administrative court,'" espeeiall y when looking back at court
pra etice sinee 1949"'. In particular, such a litigation is not of a eonstitutional
law nature as mentioned in sec. 40 (1) 1 of the Aet on Administrative Courts
(Verwaltungsgerichtsordn ung), sinee the parties of the dispure are always
ordinary eitizens on the one hand and only sometimes a supreme Stare organ
on the other,''' and moreover , the constitutional underpinnings of the right to
diplomatie protection do not necessarily lead to the assumption that only
constitutional courts should be eomp etent to decide such a eonfliet.''' Further-
more, there would be no denial of an access to administrative courts only
beeause of the international law element of diplomatic proteetion. The mere
fact that an administrative court may somet imes be bound to submit eertain
relevant issues of publie international law to the jurisdietion of the Federal
Constitutional Court (art, 100 [2] of the Basic Law) should be evidenee
enough for proving the original eompetenee of the regular (administrative)
218 See, supra, nore 170.
2t. See also, Seren; (note 137), 1023.
Z! O See, supra, Dat es 76 and 77.
111 Sec, Geck {note 62), 520 and 536; Doehring (note 5). 9-4-100.
2n See the surveys on "Deutsche Rechtsprechung in völkerredtdi chen Fragen", as compiled
by Christian Tomssduu , in: Z.öRV vol. 28 (1968), 48-147 (112-116): Albert Bleckmann,
in: Z.öRV vol. 31 (1971), 271-343 (312-313); vol . 32 (1972), 71- 166 (124-126), and
583-615 (606): vol. 34 (1974), 737-nl (751); vol. 36 (1976), 856-875 (861); vol. 37
(1977), 306-321 (316-321); Wolf D. Kischla., in: ZaöRV vol. 37 (1977), 790-804 (796-
797); Hans Kr üek. in: ZaöRV vol. 39 (1979), 83-125 (98); Monika Vicrhtilig. in: ZaöRV
vol. 42 (1982), 121-149 (129): vol. 43 (1983), 118-156 (129) .
%Z3 Kopp (note 206), 114; Redeker I tJon Oertzm {noee 207). 95 ; OskarTschira I Walt er
Schmit l Glaes er, Verwalrungsprozeßrecht, 6th ed. Stuttgart et al. 1983, 34-35.
zu Kopp (note 207) , 115; ErichEyermann I LuJwig Froebler, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung -
Kommentar, 8th ed. München 1980. 175 .
courts to deal with such legal problems in the course of their decision-making.'"
As to the kind of action to be taken, first of all, a distinction has to be rnade
between two forms of behavi our which can be chosen by the adrninistration at
an earl ier date. The competent organs can either already have issued a rul ing
which dismissed the petit ioner 's claim for protective measures, or they can
simply have remained inac tive and silent . In any way it seems to be necessary,
however, that the aggrieved person required certain State activities for his
protection before he could ever gain access to the courts, since nobody is
entid ed to be hear d by a judge on the rneri ts of his case when there is no need
for judicial protection.'" If a petitioner would (presumably) be aggrieved
because of the explicit denial of the exercising (of a certain kind of) diplo-
matic protection, he would hardly be cap able of suing only against rhis sole
ruling. As he is asking for an official activity to be fulfilled by the defendant
Stare (organ), he cannot merely claim an isolated annulment of the injuring
ace,zn but seems to be restricted to those kinds of acti ons which aim at
ordering the perfor mance of a det ermined behaviour. The petit ioner' s objective
may be the issuance of an administrati ve ruling, but there is no need for such
a cause.'" Often a claimant will just require a certain kind of behaviour to be
performed, withour any regulato ry acts being necessary for its implementa tion,
and then he has tO file a suit for "perfo rmance in general " (allgemeine
Leistungsklage).... Whether th is kind of motion or one of the va ria nts of suits
for taking a certain decision are to be held av ailable, the claimant will only
be expecting a judgment which orders the defendant to take all the necessary
measures for his efficient protection, respecting the law as interpreted by the
court, and therefore not sue for any specific act.''' Only one possible conduct
'" Ci ., BVerfGE vol. 4 (1956), 358-370 (369) ; Kopp (note 207), 121; Tschira I Schmitt
Glaeser (note 223), 35; Franz Kle in. § 83, in : Maunz / Schmidt-Bleibtreu tt al. (note 195), 5.
See also on the precondirions for an application of art . 100 (2) of the Basic Law, Rüdiger
Zu,*, Note, in : EuGRZ vol. 10 (1983), 162-163, and BVerfGE vol. 64 (1984), 1-46 (14-
21).
n e Ci -, Kopp (note 207), 78; Redeker I von Oertun (no te 207). H5; presumably also Geck
(noee 62), 520; Do ehring (note 5), 95; TrnJiranus (note 147), 37i for a narrewer viewpoi nt,
see, Schtnke (note 157), 82-83.
m A contrary position was taken by Geck (nore 62). 521 n. 199. Doehring (note 5), 94,
wrote somewhat ambiguowly of "a n actio n in rescission, particularly an action for perfor-
mance", and T reoiranus (note 147), 37, was speaking of an "action fo r performance", hut
also of a "rescissicnary suit" ,
tZ8 Blummwitz (note 152), 447 n. 29. Th is may be so at least in those cases where only the
result of a decision-making process would be regarded a.s being of a regulatory character (as
is held in respect of secs. 44 [3] no. 3 and 45 [1] 00. -4- of the Statuee on [Fede ral] Admini-
strative Procedure),
tfl This kind of action is mentioned, or ar least implied in secs. 43 (2) , 111, 113 (3), 169 (2),
and 191 (1) of th e Statute on Adminis trative Courts (VwGO); see, e, g., Kopp (note 207) , 65
and 153; Tsdnra I Schmitt Glaeser [note 223), 205-206.
:30 See, supra, notes 206 and 208.
will hardly ever be an optimal solution in this context, Normally, no judge
will thus order exactly which steps should be taken by the defendant."! In the
case of actions because of official inactivity as weil as in the case of appeals
against negative rulings, a violation of petitioner's own rights may hardly
be held to be evidently impossible under those circumstances, since the sub-
jective right does not just originate in a mere formal participatory position
which is gained by virtue of a sole motion to grant protection.'" But also when
taking an action for "performance in general", a claimant would have to fulfil
the conditions stated in sec. 42 (2) of the Act on Administrative Courts.... In
any case, however, there is no need for preliminary procedures (Widerspruchs-
verfahren) (sees. 68 [2J, [IJ 2 no. 1 of the Act on Administrative Courts).
b) De constitutione lata a constitutional complaint cannot be founded
merely on a (presumable) violation of the right to protection abroad. The
petitioner is bound to declare that he has been injured in some specific rights
whidi are granted by the Basic Law (cf. art. 93 [IJ no. 4 [aJ of the consti-
tution).'" Since, and insofar as such an extraordinary way of judicial redress is
available in connection with exercising diplomatie protection (resp. the lack
thereof), it may be sought, too. H, however, an individual has access to admi-
nistrative courts against a denial of granting protection, then sec. 90 (2) 1
of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-
gesetz} normally prevents a claimant from appealing immediately to the
supreme German judicial body, In particular, the genuine political aspects of
such a litigation do not establish that court's first- (and last-) instance
jurisdiction.'" Exceptionally, only a constitutional complaint can be taken if
231 In international litigation relating to staff matters, ir may cften be important to look
at time limits for appealing agairrst decisions of administrative organs of international organi-
zations; see, Pellet (note 55), 686-688, and 732-736.
232 On restrictions on the right (0 sue, see particularly, Kopp (note 207), 194; Redeker /
von Oertzen (note 207), 143. Cf. also the contributions on "Das Verwaltungsverfahren zwi-
sehen Verwaltungsef6zienz und Rechtssdtutzaufrrag" by Rainer Wahl, in: VVdStRL vol. 41
(1982),151-192 (181-182), lost Pietzdeer, in: op. cit., 193-231 (222), Christoph Degenbart,
in: DVBl. vol . 97 (1982) . 872-886 (879) . and by Fritz Ossenbühl. in: Neue Zeitschrift für
Verwaltungsrecht vol. 1 (1982),465-472 (471); Rudolf Steinberg. Komplexe Verwaltungsver-
fahren zwischen Verwaltungseffizienz und Redrtsschutzaufrrag, in : DöV vol. 35 (1982).619-
631 (629).
t3S An analogous application of this provision is proposed, e. g., by Tschira I Schmitt Glaeser
(note 223). 215, with further references; the contrary position is held by Kopp (note 207). 168,
and by Redeker I von Oertzen (note 207), 207.
23. Ci.; Blumemoitz (note 152), 447 n. 29; id.; Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts über die Ostverträge, in: EuGRZ vol. 2 (1975), 556-560 (558); see also, Klein
(note 146), 708 resp. 40. An exact descriprion may be found in Treviranus' study (note 147).
37; see also Bleckmann / Busse (note 153),796; Geck {note 62), 543; Doehring (note 5), 94 n.
345; Ress (note 128), 451 n. 118; Bleelemann (noce 153), 346.
235 The constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) does not seem tO be always of
"general significance"; see, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, § 90, in: Maunz I Schmidt-Bleibtreu et al.
the arguments for the lack of sufficient protection are derived from the
doubtful negotiation or the dubious contents of an international treaty....
In the course of the cases which have been decided by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court up to now, the petitioners sometimes have been unable to
present evidence for being aggrieved in their own rights by the Stare act of
approval, and therefore the action was held inadmissible.'" At least, however ,
no review of the merits of any governmental act has led to a verdict of
unlawfulness under the provisions of the Basic Law.'"
c) Urgency and summary proceedings as stipulated in sec. 123 of the Act
on Administrative Courts and in sec. 32 of the Act on the Federal Consti-
tutional Court may eventually be regarded as a most efficient kind of judicial
protection, at least from the point of view of the injured citizen. But looking
at the na rrow criteria applied in the case of temporary court orders in general,
and in particular when reviewing statutory preconditions"', judges will fairly
seIdom be ready to decide in favour of the petitioner since - as normally in
this context - ,<0 disadvantages of a merely economic nature'41 may probably
be the only events to happen before full judicial proceedings will start.'"
(note 195), 161. The Federal Constitutional Court is moreover not bound to apply the
exceptional authority which is provided for in sec. 90 (2) 2 of the Starure on the Federal
Constitutional Court; see, BVerfGE val. 14 (1965), 192-194 (194); Schmidt-Bleibtreu, in:
op. cu., 164-165.
238 Tbc statute incorporating a treary into municipal law can only be reviewed judicially
in the war mentioned above; ci., for an early case BVerfGE vol . 2 (1953), 292-295 (295).
237 See, in particular, BVerGE vcl . 40 (1976), 177-179; also BVerfGE vol. 38 (1975),
49-51 (51), and BVerfGE vol. 5S (1981), 362, where the court is assuming ehe admissibil iry
of the action.
288 Cf., BVerfGE vol. 6 (1957), 290-390 and vo1. 55 (1981), 349-370, for the con-
tinuity of the Court's jurisprudence; see also, BVerfGE vol. 36 (1974), 1-37 (29-31 ).
l!31l See, BVerfGE vol. 46 (1978), 160-165 (163-164), and, more recently, BVerfG, in:
EuGRZ vol . 8 (1981), 157-158 (158), and in : EuGRZ vo1. 11 (1984), 44; also BVedG, in:
JZ vol. 38 (1983), 388-389 (388). ct; the comments hy P..nz Klein , § 32, in : Maun z I
Schmidt-Bleibtreu et al . (note 195), 7-10 ; Bleckmann {note 153), 249-252; Schenke (note
157), 212 and 213. On the procedure before administrative courts, see, Kopp (note 207),
885-886. Even if an action for "performance in general" would be the correce choice in the
course of rhe main litigation, temporary judicial protection would be of avail by way of
sec. 123 of the Statute on Administrative Courts (para. 5); see, op . cit., 875.
240 This follows from the special kind of injuries or imminent dangers which can actually
happen in these instances; see, supra, notes 95 and 96.
' 41 ct; BVedGE vo1. 35 (1974), 193-202 (197), and 257-263 (261) ; but also BVe,fGE
vol. 59 (1982), 280-287 (286-287).
t 42 See on the one hand, BVerfGE vol. 7 (1958), 175-183 (179) ; Klein (note 239), 19; on
the othe r, Redeker / von Oertzen (note 207), 574 and 577-578; see also, Kopp (ncte 207),
879; Schenke (not e 157), 214.
IV. C 0 n c I u s ion
The position of the Federal Republic wirhin the international community, its
membership relations with all the important universal and regional interna-
tional organizations confine the exercise of diplomatie proteetion against
fore ign non-state public authorities within narrow limits . If, notwithstanding
.any internal ehedes and balances, institutional organs would in fact be acting
in evident contradiction to publi c international law norms, the legal effects
of such conduct based solelyon the membership status may at least be called
into question, if not be ut terly void. ' " Nevertheless, this "dianneling" - or,
to speak with L. Caoare: "juridictionalisat ion" - ' " of diplomatic protection
is to be described as alandmark event in the development of border-crossing
international relations, just as it has been a significant factor of a peaceful
solut ion of conflicts in the past and may probably Function in th is manner in
Fut ure times as weH.tU
U J See, e. g'I Bemhardt {nct e 26), 34-35; Ozieke (note 82), 253-255.
:tu Cava re {note 83), 78.
:u Fot a similar view, see, Günther Jaenitlee, Die Grundsätze über den geridrtlidren Rechts-
smutz des Einzelnen gegen die Exekutive im System der Völkerrednsordnung, in: Hermann
Mo,/" [note 89), vol. 111; 285-324 (311- 312). Thereby, the purpese of arr. 24 (3) of the
Basic Law, whidi is "to move forward at the same pace as the international arbitral and
judicial bodies are extending their powers twill be con6rmed once more; Bleckmann (noee 153),
232; sec also Rojahn (note 159), 129; Stern (note 153), vol. I: 374.
